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Despite claims by international donor agencies that judicial reform efforts in 
Mongolia have been a great success, this Article argues that Mongolian courts 
continue to grossly lack integrity, transparency, and accountability—and are 
perceived by the Mongolian public as more corrupt today than when donor-
funded judicial reform efforts began almost a decade ago.  This Article further 
argues that the failure of judicial reform in Mongolia stems in significant part 
from the “capture” of donor-funded judicial reform efforts by elites within the 
Mongolian judicial sector.  It concludes that the inherent tendency for project 
capture in the “institution-building” approach to judicial reform that 
international donor agencies favor should add to calls to limit the approach in 
favor of bottom-up efforts to push for meaningful judicial reform. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
By the early 2000s, systemic corruption was widely recognized as an 
endemic and growing problem in post-communist Mongolia.1  “Grand” 
corruption among political and economic elites was widespread and, 
according to an assessment by the United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”), threatened to “ultimately derail democracy 
and development.”2  Courts were regarded as particularly corrupt, with 
judges and prosecutors ranking in public opinion surveys just below 
customs officials as the most corrupt governmental officials in 
Mongolia.3 
It was in this environment that multilateral and bilateral donor 
institutions, including the World Bank and USAID, began to invest 
millions of dollars to reform the Mongolian judiciary.4  These donor 
agencies saw judicial reform as a key part of stemming corruption, 
ensuring the “rule of law” and thereby promoting economic growth and 
 
1 See generally CASALS & ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN 
MONGOLIA:  FINAL REPORT 9-10 tbl.1 (2005) (summarizing results of various 
corruption studies across sectors of Mongolian government); MORRIS ROSSABI, 
MODERN MONGOLIA: FROM KHANS TO COMMISSARS TO CAPITALISTS 59-62 
(2005) (discussing the relationship of corruption to foreign donor institutions); 
David Sneath, Reciprocity and Notions of Corruption in Contemporary 
Mongolia, 25 MONGOLIAN STUDIES 85, 85 (2002) (recognizing a “rapid increase 
in perceived corruption”). 
2 CASALS & ASSOCS., supra note 1, at 1. 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 Such institutions include, among others, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank (“ADB”), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (“GTZ”), and USAID. See, e.g., OPERATIONS EVALUATION 
DEP’T, ASIAN DEV. BANK, MONGOLIA:  FROM TRANSITION TO TAKEOFF 28-30 
(2008) (ADB); OPERATIONS POLICY & COUNTRY SERVS., THE WORLD BANK, 
STATUS OF PROJECTS IN EXECUTION–FY08 635 (2008) (World Bank); U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS:  FISCAL 
YEAR 2007 190 (2006); Division of Dev. Educ. & Info., Fed. Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Dev., Legal and Judicial Reform in Development 
Cooperation 17 (Position Paper Special 064, 2002) (GTZ), available at 
http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/spezial/spezial064pdf.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
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democracy.5  Moreover, donor agencies, and USAID in particular, 
recognized that “judicial [c]orruption ha[d] become a more prominent 
issue,” with “suspicions of improper influence and rumors . . . of high-
level corruption in the judicial system.”6  Nevertheless, neither USAID 
nor any other major donor agency chose to address corruption within the 
judiciary directly.7 
 
5 See INT’L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM:  ANNUAL REPORT 2006 24 (2007) [hereinafter 
REPORT 2006] (“Effective and efficient delivery of justice is vital for ensuring 
that all Mongolians live within a state in which the rule of law is respected and 
followed and essential for sustained economic growth.”), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACI763.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Independence and Corruption (“measures of judicial 
independence are related to other positive outcomes such as higher levels of 
growth and of political and economic freedom”), in TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007:  CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 15, 15 
(Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007). 
See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93-122 (2006) (discussing role of judiciary 
in rule of law); Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, Introduction:  Rules 
Systems and the Development Process, 2 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 1, 5-11 
(2006) (summarizing findings that rule of law and governance policies are 
holistically connected to economic and cultural norms and dynamically affect 
local power dynamics). 
6 INT’L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM (JRP):  2002 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2003) 
[hereinafter REPORT 2002], available at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Report/ 
2002ReportEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
7 See, e.g., REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 16 (“Although the [Judicial 
Reform Program (“JRP”)] did not plan specific anticorruption activities for 
2006, the JRP’s work with the courts, POs and other relevant institutions focuses 
largely on the development of efficient and transparent processes aimed at 
reducing opportunities for corruption.”).  This is consistent with judicial reform 
programs sponsored by international agencies in other countries.  See, e.g., Linn 
Hammergren, The Multilateral Development Banks and Judicial Corruption, 
STRENGTHENING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  ELIMINATING JUDICIAL 
CORRUPTION, 9 CIJL YEARBOOK 2000 73, 74 (2001) (“for corruption as for 
many other issues, a direct, frontal approach may not be the more effective 
strategy”). 
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Rather, donor-funded judicial reform in Mongolia followed, and 
continues to follow, an institution-building approach.8  This approach, 
which is consistent with donor-funded approaches to judicial reform in 
other developing countries, aims to strengthen judicial institutions by, for 
example, developing judicial resources and infrastructure, improving 
“case management,” enhancing judicial “professionalism” through 
training and education, and increasing judicial salaries.9  Moreover, this 
approach is “top-down” in that reform priorities are set by, or at least 
require the consent of, “key stakeholders”—which in Mongolia meant 
the Supreme Court, the General Counsel of Courts, the General 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs 
(“MoJHA”).10  Consistent with this approach, the offices of the major 
 
8 See, e.g., REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that the JRP seeks to 
build public support for judicial institutions). 
9 See INT’L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM:  ANNUAL REPORT 2007 3-5, 15-16 (2008) 
[hereinafter REPORT 2007] (discussing JRP efforts in these areas), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACL250.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).  The 
institution-building approach to judicial reform typically includes: 
courthouse construction and repair; purchase of furniture, computers, and other 
equipment and materials; drafting new laws and regulations; training judges, 
lawyers, and other legal personnel; establishing management and 
administration systems for judiciaries; support for judicial and other 
training/management institutes; building up bar associations; and international 
exchanges for judges, court administrators, and lawyers. 
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy:  The Legal Empowerment 
Alternative 11-12 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Rule of Law Series, 
Working Paper No. 41, 2003), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).  
See also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR JUSTICE SYSTEM OF 
MONGOLIA 1-7 (2006) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006] (on file with 
author) (discussing goals of JRP); Linn Hammergren, Fighting Judicial 
Corruption:  A Comparative Perspective from Latin America (describing these 
type of measures as “the usual reform measures”), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 138, 139. 
10 See INT’L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM:  2001 ANNUAL REPORT ii (2002) [hereinafter 
REPORT 2001] (noting that the JRP  “responded to the priorities defined by the 
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs and is designed to assist in the 
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donor-funded judicial reform programs in Mongolia, including USAID’s 
Judicial Reform Program (“JRP”), were physically located within the 
MoJHA.11 
While this collaborative approach may help ensure the participation 
of institutional stakeholders, it also discourages discussion of 
corruption—much less action to address it.  Donor agencies are “wary of 
fomenting bad relations with the courts” by bringing up the “corruption 
issue” and judges, especially to the extent that they benefit from corrupt 
practices, are “understandably reluctant to mention it.”12  Nevertheless, 
donor agencies in Mongolia and elsewhere justify the institution-building 
approach to judicial reform on that grounds that the “usual reform 
measures”—such as training,13 increased professionalism14 and better 
“management structures”15—will have the corollary effect of reducing 
corruption and improper influence.16  Reformers argue that corruption is 
more prevalent when judges do not understand the law, cases are easily 
“lost” due to lack of case management systems, judicial salaries are low 
 
implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia, a plan 
developed by Mongolian stakeholders in 1999-2000, and passed by Parliament 
in 2000”), available at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Report/ 
2001ReportEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); REPORT 2007, supra note 9, 
at 14, 20, 25 (identifying the Supreme Court, General Counsel of Courts, 
General Prosecutor’s Office, and MoJHA as key stakeholders).  See also 
REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 23 (specifically excluding the Mongolian bar 
association from the list of “core stakeholders”). 
11 See generally Mongolia Judicial Reform Program, Main Page,  
http://www.ncsc.mn (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (giving the address of the JRP 
within the MoJHA building). 
12 Hammergren, supra note 9, at 139. 
13 REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 16-17. 
14 Id. at 15. 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 See  Hammergren, supra note 9, at 139 ( “Nonetheless, many of the usual 
reform measures—new selection systems, higher salaries and budgets, real 
judicial careers with guaranteed tenure, training, courtroom reorganisation and 
automation, and law revision—were also seen as partial solutions. . . . For 
example, the introduction of oral proceedings was said to increase transparency, 
while better courtroom administration would reduce the chances for 
manipulating files (a problem as often attributed to court staff as to judges).”). 
214 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:209 
 
and working conditions are poor.17  Reformers thus contend that 
addressing such second level facilitators of corruption will make 
corruption both less attractive and more difficult to conceal.18 
Consistent with this theory, USAID claims that its nearly decade-
long Mongolian JRP, which came to a close in March 2009, 
“significantly improved transparency and efficiency, and reduced 
opportunities for system manipulation,”19 and that, as a result, “[p]ublic 
perception of the justice sector has improved in all areas since the JRP 
began its work.”20  As such, USAID has concluded that the JRP was 
“highly successful”21 and one of “the best projects ever implemented in 
Mongolia.”22 
 
17 See INT’L PROGRAMS DIV, NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM (JRP) WORK-PLAN YEAR THREE 3 (2003) 
[hereinafter WORKPLAN 2003] (“Inadequate salaries for judges, prosecutors, and 
other judicial sector staff made these positions less attractive for well-qualified 
lawyers and, most importantly, increased the potential for corruption.”), 
available at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Workplan/2003WPEnglish.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2009) and id. at 8 (implying that strengthening and development 
of case management systems creates a more accountable and accessible 
judiciary). 
18 See EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA ET AL., UNDERMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION 20 (Hoover Inst. On War, 
Revolution & Peace, Essays in Pub. Policy Series No. 114, 2005) (arguing that 
“multiagency task force systems” incorporating electronic court records made 
available to defense attorneys and the general public reduces corruption); 
Vincent Yang & Linda Ehrics, The Professionalism of Judges: Education, 
Salaries, and Career Structure in Asia ( “judicial reform efforts in Asia often 
include education and training as part of efforts to fight judicial corruption”), in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 48, 54. 
19 USAID/Mongolia, Judicial Reform Program http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
programs/jrp/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
20 Judicial Reform Program:  Q3 Updates 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (posting of Skip Waskin, Sept. 15, 2005, 
01:56) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
21 USAID/Mongolia Updates March 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
updates/article-574.html (April 6, 2009) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
22 USAID/Mongolia Updates April 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
updates/article-615.html (May 11, 2009) last visited Oct. 28, 2009).  See also 
REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 3-4 (touting the successes of the JRP). 
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USAID’s claim of success is belied, however, by a public opinion 
survey commissioned by the JRP itself in 2007.  This survey found that 
only 28.0% percent of Mongolians believe that they would be treated 
fairly were they to find themselves in court. 23  It also found that around 
85-90% of Mongolians believe that the courts show favoritism to the 
wealthy, public officials, relatives and friends of court personnel, and 
corporations.24  Likewise, the survey reported that 72-75% of 
Mongolians believe judicial decisions are influenced by political 
considerations, judges’ own personal interests, and by government 
officials.25  Moreover, it reported that almost 97% of Mongolians believe 
that the cost of going to court is increased by the necessity of “paying 
bribes” and 94% believe that it is increased by “unethical behavior.”26 
More strikingly, the survey found that public attitudes toward the 
judiciary have grown increasingly negative during the period of reform.27  
For example, 21.3% of the public thought that corruption was a problem 
within the judiciary in 2003, 33.8% thought it was a problem by 2005, 
and 38.1% thought so by 2007.28  Additionally, there has been a 
“dramatic drop” in public confidence in the Supreme Court and the Tsets 
(Constitutional Court) in particular.29  Tellingly, confidence in the courts 
is significantly lower—and increasingly so—among individuals who 
have had actual experience in the courts than among those who have 
not—with a three-fold increase since 2005 in negative perception of the 
courts among actual court users.30 
 
23 L. Sumati & Ts. Sergelen, Trend Lines in Public Perception of Judicial 
System Administration in Mongolia, in REPORT 2007, supra note 9, attach. G. at 
20 tbl.7.1.8.  The 2007 JRP annual report claims that this opinion survey found 
that people “still believe” that judges are “honest and fair.” REPORT 2007, supra 
note 9, at 26.  In fact, only 21% of respondents strongly agreed with that 
statement in 2007.  Sumati & Sergelen, supra, at 28 tbl.7.4.3. 
24 Sumati & Sergelen, supra note 23, at 21 tbls.7.2.4-6, 32 tbl.7.5.2. 
25 Id. at 29 tbl.7.4.10, 32 tbls.7.5.3-4. 
26 Id. at 38 tbls.8.7-8. 
27 See id. at 2 (noting “significant changes in public attitudes of negative 
nature” since 2005) and id. at 31 (noting “significant growth” in the percentage 
of people who think that judicial decisions are influenced by “political 
considerations” and judges’ “personal interests”). 
28 Id. at 39 tbl.8.1. 
29
 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. at 2, 39 tbl.8.1. 
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These surveys not only contrast with claims made by USAID about 
the effectiveness of its Judicial Reform Program, but also contradict the 
view of judges who contend that corruption is not a significant problem 
within the judiciary.31  Given that public perceptions of corruption may 
overstate its actuality,32 these insider views should not be dismissed.  In 
contrast, the fact that actual court users have the most negative 
perceptions of the courts suggests that something more than public 
misperception may be at play. 
In an attempt to sort out competing claims about the status of judicial 
reform in Mongolia, I conducted an assessment of the Mongolian courts 
in the summer of 2008.33  This assessment found that while progress has 
been made in improving judicial resources and training, Mongolian 
courts still lack sufficient political independence and, contrary to the 
claims of USAID, grossly lack integrity, transparency, accountability.  In 
addition, despite significant donor effort and expense in computerizing 
case tracking systems and improving court administration the assessment 
found that Mongolian courts are not particularly efficient. 
 
31 For a discussion of judges’ views of the courts, see infra note 50.  As a 
general matter, judges blame the perception of corruption within the judiciary on 
an irresponsible press and incompetent lawyers who accuse judges of taking 
bribes in order to cover their own inadequacies as lawyers.  Interview with 
Anonymous, Supreme Court Justice, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 6, 2008). 
32 See Transparency Int’l, How Prevalent Is Bribery in the Judicial Sector?, 
(“the public often views its judiciary as more corrupt than it actually is: more 
people around the world described their judiciary as ‘extremely corrupt’ than 
have personally been part of judicial corruption”), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 11, 14.  See also INT’L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM YEAR FOUR 
WORKPLAN 8 (2004) (“public opinion surveys are an imperfect measure of 
judicial effectiveness because the public has a relatively low level of expertise 
about the judiciary and how judicial institutions should be working”), available 
at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Workplan/2004WPEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 
28, 2009). 
33 This assessment was conducted at the request of the Open Society Forum 
of Mongolia (“OSF”).  The opinions and conclusions drawn from the assessment 
in this Article, however, are the author’s alone, and should not be misconstrued 
as the views of OSF.  In Mongolia, the judiciary includes both the courts and the 
prosecutor’s office.  The assessment looked only at the courts and the term 
judiciary is used generally in this Article to refer to the courts only. 
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The results of this assessment are important in their own right.  But 
their public disclosure is especially critical given USAID recent claims 
that its JRP was one of its “best projects ever.”34  Such a rosy picture of 
the success of judicial reform in Mongolia risks the project’s approach 
being repeated in other developing countries—particularly as Mongolia 
has been held out by the donor community as “a model for democratic 
development and anti-corruption in Central Asia.”35  This Article is thus 
meant primarily as a counterpoint to the view of USAID, and its 
implementing contractor, that judicial reform in Mongolia has been a 
resounding success.36 
The Article also argues that the failure of judicial reform in 
Mongolia stems in significant part from the “capture” of donor-funded 
judicial reform by elites within the target judicial institutions—in much 
the same way that domestic regulatory bodies can be captured by 
regulated industries.  It concludes that the inherent tendency for project 
capture in the institution-building approach to judicial reform should add 
to calls to limit top-down approaches to judicial reform in favor of a 
bottom-up effort to build up local civil society organizations that can 
push themselves for meaningful judicial reform. 
II.  METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE STATUS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 
Assessing the status of judicial reform within a country is no simple 
task.  First, there is no generally accepted methodology, nor is there 
agreement over which criteria are most important in evaluating a judicial 
 
34 USAID/Mongolia Updates April 2009, supra note 22. 
35 Bank Information Center, Mongolia: Overview, http://www.bicusa.org/ 
en/Region.22.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
36 See USAID/Mongolia, supra note 22, (referring to its previous judicial 
reform projects as “some of the best projects ever implemented in Mongolia”).  
See also REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 3-4 (describing the successes of the JRP 
in glowing terms). This USAID annual report on the JRP was prepared by its 
implementing contractor, the U.S.-based National Center for State Courts 
(“NCSC”).  NCSC also runs judicial reform programs for USAID in Haiti, 
Kosovo, and Lebanon.  In January 2001, NCSC received $10 million from 
American taxpayers for its work in Mongolia alone.  See REPORT 2001, supra 
note 10, at 1. 
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system.37  Additionally, many aims of judicial reform—judicial 
independence, fairness, impartiality, and even efficiency to some 
degree—tend toward qualitative rather than quantitative measurement.38 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to identify some essential 
characteristics of an independent, fair, impartial, and efficient judiciary.  
For example, in an independent judiciary, decisions would be free from 
undue political influence from other branches of government or other 
public officials.  Similarly, an impartial judiciary would not be 
influenced by payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested 
parties.  To the extent that characteristics of an independent, impartial, 
qualified and efficient judiciary can be identified, and assuming those are 
the goals of the reform, the central task in assessing the progress of 
reform in a particular judicial system lies in developing a metric for 
measuring, more or less objectively, the extent to which these various 
characteristics are descriptive of that judicial system. 
For example, the Rule of Law Initiative of the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) uses a Judicial Reform Index (“JRI”) to 
qualitatively assess the status of judicial reform in emerging democracies 
and transitioning states.39  The JRI identifies 30 factors “that facilitate the 
 
37 See Linn Hammergren, Diagnosing Judicial Performance:  Toward a 
Tool To Help Guide Judicial Reform Programs, paper prepared for 
Transparency International 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, 
Durban 9-10 (Oct. 13, 1999) (discussing disagreement among reformers over the 
correct methodology and criteria for evaluating judicial reform), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/hammergren
JudicialPerf.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
38 See id. at 3 (“[R]eformers have tended to shy away from the more 
qualitative aspects of judicial performance.”). 
39 See generally American Bar Association, The ABA Rule of Law 
Initiative:  Judicial Reform Index, http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/ 
judicial_reform_index.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (describing the basis 
and application of the JRI).  See also Mariana Sousa, A Brief Overview of 
Judicial Reform in Latin America:  Objectives, Challenges, and 
Accomplishments (noting that the American Bar Association’s JRI developed for 
the Eastern and Central European Law Initiative “serves as an analytic device to 
evaluate the accomplishments of reform efforts”), in THE STATE OF STATE 
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 87, 106 (Eduardo Lora, World Bank, ed., 2007).   
2009] JUDICIAL REFORM IN MONGOLIA 219 
 
development of an accountable, effective, independent judiciary.”40  
Each factor is fashioned in the reform index as a descriptive statement 
(e.g., “Ethnic and religious minorities, as well as both genders, are 
represented amongst the pool of nominees and in the judiciary 
generally.”41) and then allocated one of three values—positive, neutral, 
or negative—depending on whether or not the statement corresponds to 
the reality in a given country.42  If it strongly corresponds, the country is 
given a score of “positive” for that statement.  However, if the statement 
is not at all representative of the conditions in that country, the country 
gets a “negative” score.  If the conditions within the country correspond 
in some ways but not in others, it gets “neutral” score.  Additionally 
these 30 factors are grouped into categories including:  Quality, 
Education, and Diversity; Judicial Powers; Financial Resources; 
Structural Safeguards, Accountability and Transparency; and 
Efficiency.43  This grouping of factors allows the reader to form a quick 
impression of a country’s progress in any given area.44 
While this approach has many strengths, which were incorporated 
into an assessment tool for the Mongolian courts, it has several 
weaknesses that the Mongolian assessment tool sought to avoid.  First, 
while the factors identified by the JRI are all relevant in assessing the 
progress of judicial reform, the JRI does not include a number of other 
factors that are relevant to status of judicial reform45 and fails specifically 
to address a number of issues that should be of great importance to 
judicial reform if the goal of reform is to promote fair and impartial 
judicial decision-making.  Many of these involve the degree of judicial 
 
40 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR GEORGIA ii-iii 
(2005) (explaining the methodology for assessing reform efforts), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/georgia-jri-2005-eng.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009). 
41 American Bar Association, The ABA Rule of Law Initiative:   Judicial 
Reform Index Factors, http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/judicial_reform_ 
index_factors.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
42 See Sousa, supra note 39, at 106. 
43
 American Bar Association, supra note 41. 
44 The JRI, however, leaves it to the reader of the JRI report to develop their 
own impression of the judicial system’s overall reform progress. 
45 See, e.g., Hammergren, supra note 37, at 19-22 (proposing a detailed 
checklist for evaluating judicial performance). 
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integrity, transparency, and accountability.  Thus, while borrowing 
heavily from the JRI, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts 
identifies 60 separate factors (rather than 30 as in the JRI) that would be 
indicative of successful judicial reform.46  These factors were evaluated 
as part of the assessment of the Mongolian courts. 
An additional weakness of the JRI is that the score for each factor 
represents the conclusion of one, or at most a few, “legal specialists who 
are generally familiar with the country and region,” after “limited 
questioning of a cross-section of judges, lawyers, journalists, and outside 
observers with detailed knowledge of the judicial system.”47  The JRI 
thus risks being tainted by the biases of the specialist who is generally 
familiar with the country and will consciously or unconsciously approach 
the task with preconceived notions and opinions about the country’s 
judiciary.  Such biases may cause the specialist to selectively attend to 
information that supports those beliefs and discount or reinterpret 
information that does not.48 
To counter this possibility of bias, the assessment tool for the 
Mongolian courts reflects the collective judgments of 22 individuals with 
significant expertise and experience with the Mongolian judiciary, all of 
whom completed anonymous and confidential surveys in which they 
 
46 Some of the disparity in the number of factors comes from the fact that 
the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts breaks some JRI factors into their 
component parts.  For example, rather than asking in one compound statement 
whether “[e]thnic and religious minorities, as well as both genders, are 
represented amongst the pool of nominees and in the judiciary generally,” AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 40, at 16, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts 
asks separate questions—one about representation of minorities and the other 
about gender representation.  Similarly, whereas the JRI asks whether “[j]udicial 
decisions are based solely on the facts and law without any undue influence 
from senior judges (e.g. court presidents), private interests, or other branches of 
government,” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 40, at 37, the assessment tool for the 
Mongolian courts breaks this down into several questions and adds additional 
questions related to other types of undue influence over court decisions. 
47 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 40, at iii. 
48 See Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton, Introduction (summarizing 
collected papers addressing influence of emotion on perception), in 
CONSCIOUSNESS & EMOTION:  AGENCY, CONSCIOUS CHOICE, AND SELECTIVE 
PERCEPTION ix, x-xi (Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton eds., 2005). 
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evaluated the Mongolian courts on each of the 60 factors.49  In choosing 
the experts, every effort was made to draw from a broad cross-section of 
the legal community and across the political spectrum.  Survey 
participants included commercial attorneys, law professors, heads of 
non-governmental organizations, public officials, law enforcement 
officers, defense attorneys and prosecutors—such that no particular 
viewpoint was overrepresented and one can have confidence at the very 
least in areas where there was broad consensus among survey 
participants. 
Another concern with the JRI is that it scores each factor as only 
negative, positive or neutral.  Such a scoring system, while simple, 
provides little information other than an up or down for each factor and 
does not distinguish between factors that are overwhelmingly negative or 
positive and those that are only marginally either.  Additionally, as 
discussed above, the positive or negative score represents the subjective 
conclusion of only one or a few individuals—and thus appears to convey 
more information than it actually does. 
In contrast, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts assigns 
each factor a numerical score based upon the collective judgment of 22 
Mongolian legal experts—and my personal opinion, as the “specialist” 
conducting the assessment, is not reflected or included in the score.50  
 
49 See Appendix B, infra. 
50 At the request of a member of the Supreme Court whom I interviewed, I 
also distributed copies of the “Survey of the Status of Court Reform in 
Mongolia” to the Research Center of the Supreme Court for distribution to 
Supreme Court justices, primarily as a means of comparing the Courts’ 
perception of the judiciary with that of outside experts.  There are 15 Supreme 
Court Justices, but only eight surveys were returned by the Supreme Court’s 
Research Center.  All but two of the returned surveys did not identify the 
position of the individual who filled out the survey, as the form requests.  Thus, 
it was impossible to tell if the rest of the surveys were actually filled out by 
Supreme Court Justices or were filled out by Supreme Court staff, such as clerks 
or employees of the research center.  Additionally, because the forms were 
collected by one individual at the Supreme Court, the anonymity of the survey 
participants and their ability to answer the survey without fear of reprisal may 
have been compromised.  As a general matter, however, the surveys returned by 
the Supreme Court Research Center gave the judiciary significantly higher 
scores than did the outside experts.  This was particularly the case in terms of 
court integrity—which the Supreme Court rated as high and outside experts 
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Rather, the score represents the average response of experts surveyed on 
a scale of 1-5 and asked to identify on that continuum the degree to 
which they agreed that each positive statement was an adequate 
reflection of the Mongolian Courts (“1” represented “Strongly Disagree” 
and “5” represented “Strongly Agree”).  Scores below 3 (with 3 being 
“Neutral”) are failing scores and those above 3 are passing scores and are 
identified as such. Additionally, the assessment includes the percentage 
of experts who agree or disagree with each statement so as to identify 
those areas where there is widespread consensus as to the state of the 
Mongolian courts. 
Finally, the assessment tool, like the JRI, divides the factors into 
categories (for example, “Integrity”), but unlike the JRI, each category is 
given an overall “grade” reflecting the status of judicial reform in that 
area.  The possible “grades” are excellent, sufficient, marginally 
sufficient, marginally insufficient, insufficient, or grossly insufficient. 
In order to inform these overall assessments with more than raw 
numbers, the survey also invited written comments and explanations 
from those who took the survey—an opportunity taken advantage of by 
many survey participants.  I also conducted in-person interviews with 
various experts on the Mongolian Judiciary—including Supreme Court 
Justices, attorneys, law professors, and heads of NGOs, public officials, 
and law enforcement officers.  While there was not a one-to-one 
correlation to those interviewed and those surveyed, the narrative 
accounts gathered during those interviews help elucidate the raw 
numbers. 
III.  THE STATUS OF COURT REFORM IN MONGOLIA 
As the below numbers show, quality, training and diversity of judges 
is an overall area where judicial reform has made some significant 
progress in Mongolia, but where much remains to be done.  One 
particular bright spot is continuing education of judges.  This has been a 
focus of GTZ, USAID, and the World Bank, all of which have not only 
 
generally rated as extremely low.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court surveys 
reflected a need for more resources and better facilities, whereas outside experts 
rated the level of court resources as sufficient. 
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sponsored and funded numerous trainings,51 but also helped establish the 
National Law Center (“NLC”), housed in a gleaming new building, as a 
hub for the training of judges and lawyers.52  The fact that a significant 
plurality of experts (43%) agrees that judges receive adequate continuing 
legal education, with only 19% disagreeing, is evidence of the success of 
these efforts. 
Table 1:  Quality, Training, and Diversity—Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
Judges are well-qualified (Judges have formal 
university-level legal training and have practiced 
before tribunals before taking the bench.) 
2.4 
Disagree 66% 
Agree 20% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
Judges are well-trained (Before taking the bench 
judges are required to take relevant courses 
concerning basic substantive and procedural areas of 
the law and the role of the judge in society.) 
2.4 
Disagree 57% 
Agree 19% 
Neutral 24% 
Failing 
Judges receive adequate continuing legal education 
(Judges must undergo, on a regular basis 
professionally prepared legal education courses, 
which adequately inform them of changes and 
developments in the law.) 
3.3 
Disagree 19% 
Agree 43% 
Neutral 33% 
Passing 
Minority Representation (The number of judges who 
are members of ethic and religious minorities 
adequately reflects the percentage of ethnic and 
religious minorities in the overall population.) 
2.5 
Disagree 42% 
Agree 21% 
Neutral 37% 
Failing 
Gender Balance (The number of male and female 
judges is roughly equal at all levels of the court 
system.) 
2.0 
Disagree 77% 
Agree 5% 
Neutral 18% 
Failing 
 
On the other hand, 66% percent of experts disagree with the 
statement that judges are well-qualified to begin with and 57% believe 
that they do not receive adequate training before taking the bench.  
 
51
 See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 16-18 (describing the JRP’s 
involvement with continuing legal education in Mongolia). 
52 See The World Bank Group, Projects and Operations:  Contract Details:  
Construction of the National Legal Center, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
external/projects/main?pagePK=104542&contractid=1233911 (last visited Oct. 
28, 2009) (reporting that a US $999,000 contract was awarded for construction 
of the NLC). 
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Survey and interview participants suggested some possible reasons for 
these low marks including concern that the clearest path to becoming a 
judge is not legal competence but serving first as a court secretary.  
Others complained that familial relations played a significant role in 
selection of judges, with a few family networks occupying a large 
number of judicial positions.  Additionally, experts noted that the 
selection process is highly politicized, with the President having 
disproportionate influence over the selection of judges—such that loyalty 
to the President may supersede all else in the selection of judges.  That 
said, a number of experts distinguished between Supreme Court Judges, 
whom they felt tended to be highly qualified, and lower court judges, 
who they felt often were not. 
Table 2:  Judicial Power/Authority—Sufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
Courts have the authority to determine the ultimate 
constitutionality of legislation and official acts. 
4.0 
Provided by 
Constitution 
Passing 
Courts have exclusive, ultimate jurisdiction over all 
cases concerning civil rights and liberties. 
4.0 
Provided by 
Constitution 
Passing 
Court decisions are respected and enforced by other 
branches of government. 
2.7 
Disagree 50% 
Agree 32% 
Neutral 18% 
Failing 
Court decisions may be reversed only through the 
appellate process. 
3.8 
Disagree  9% 
Agree 82% 
Neutral 9% 
Passing 
Courts have adequate subpoena, contempt, and 
enforcement powers. 
3.9 
Disagree 9% 
Agree 82% 
Neutral 9% 
Passing 
The courts’ subpoena, contempt, and enforcement 
powers are utilized and supported by other branches 
of government. 
3.8 
Disagree 5% 
Agree 77% 
Neutral 18% 
Passing 
Other branches of government do not override or 
ignore court decisions, or if they do, they are subject 
to legal action. 
3.0 
Disagree 36% 
Agree 41% 
Neutral 22% 
Neutral 
 
Mongolian courts are not lacking in formal authority or power; as the 
survey results show, they received higher marks here than in any other 
category.  Much of the authority of the Mongolian Courts is vested in the 
Courts by the Constitution itself.  For example, Article 47(1) provides 
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that judicial power belongs solely to the courts.53  Article 50(2) provides 
that Supreme Court decisions are final judiciary decisions that are 
binding upon all courts and other parties.54  Article 50(1)(3) empowers 
the Supreme Court “to examine and take decision on matters related to 
the protection of law and human rights and freedoms therein.”55 
In addition, Mongolia has a separate and independent Constitutional 
Court, or Constitutional Tsets,56 that has “supreme” authority to interpret 
the Constitution57 and the power to invalidate “laws, decrees and other 
decisions of the State Great Hural and the President, as well as 
Government decisions and international treaties signed by Mongolia” 
that are incongruous with the Constitution.58 
Nevertheless, 50% of experts surveyed disagreed with the statement 
“Court decisions are respected and enforced by other branches of 
government.”59  Similarly several experts who were interviewed 
indicated that the executive branch often does not honor court decisions 
with which it disagrees.  This raises the concern that the Supreme Court 
does not, in fact, have the final authority to interpret the law, and that 
government officials are free to ignore Supreme Court decisions with 
which they disagree.60  Indeed, the Constitution itself seems to 
undermine the “final authority” ostensibly given to the Supreme Court.  
Furthermore, Article 50(2) provides that if the Supreme Court makes an 
interpretation that is “incompatible with a law, the latter shall have 
precedence.”61  What is left unclear in practice, however, is who has the 
 
53 MONGOL ULSYN ÜNDSEN KHUULI [Constitution] art. 47  § 1  (1992) 
(Mong.), translated at http://www.frc.mn/eng/index.php?option=com_docman& 
task=doc_download&gid=330&Itemid=29 [hereinafter MONG. CONST.] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
54 Id. art. 50 § 2. 
55 Id. art. 50 § 1. 
56 See id. arts. 64-67 (describing the composition and function of the 
Constitutional Court). 
57 Id. art. 64 § 1. 
58 Id. art. 66 § 2. 
59 See supra, Table 2. 
60 One expert indicated that even tax inspectors feel free to ignore the 
Supreme Court’s decisions when they believe the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations to be wrong.  Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, Partner, Bona Lex 
Law Firm, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 7, 2008). 
61 MONG. CONST., supra note 53, art. 50 § 2. 
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authority to decide that the Supreme Court’s interpretation is 
incompatible with the law.62 
Table 3:  Survey Results on Judicial Resources and Infrastructure—
Marginally Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
The overall budget of the courts is adequate to satisfy 
the demand for court services. 
2.8 
Disagree 33% 
Agree 29% 
Neutral 38% 
Failing 
The overall budget of the courts has increased 
proportionately with the growth of the national 
budget. 
3 
Disagree 19% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 58% 
Neutral 
The judiciary receives a share of the national budget 
reflective of its position as co-equal branch of 
government 
3.2 
Disagree 19% 
Agree 47% 
Neutral 33% 
Passing 
Offices provided to judges and court administrators 
are adequate to allow performance of their duties 
3.2 
Disagree 41% 
Agree 50% 
Neutral 9% 
Passing 
The court system operates with a sufficient number 
of computers and other equipment to enable it to 
handle its caseload in a reasonably efficient manner. 
3.9 
Disagree 5% 
Agree 78% 
Neutral 18% 
Passing 
Each judge has the staff support necessary to do his 
or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to handle 
documentation and legal research. 
3.7 
Disagree 10% 
Agree 80% 
Neutral 10% 
Passing 
A system exists so that new court positions are 
created as needed. 
2.8 
Disagree 28% 
Agree 19% 
Neutral 52% 
Failing 
Judges’ salaries are adequate.  Judges salaries are 
based on a reasonable proportion of private sector 
wages and are generally sufficient to attract and 
retain qualified judges, enabling them to support their 
families and live in a reasonably secure environment 
without having to supplement with additional sources 
of income. 
3.0 
Disagree 36% 
Agree 46% 
Neutral 18% 
Neutral 
Court buildings provide a respectable environment 
for the dispensation of justice with adequate 
infrastructure. 
2.1 
Disagree 63% 
Agree 5% 
Neutral 32% 
Failing 
 
62 The Constitution seems suggest that authority belongs to the Supreme 
Court alone.  See id. (granting the Supreme Court “final” and “binding” judicial 
authority). 
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Improving judicial resources and infrastructure is another area where 
the Mongolian judiciary has made considerable strides, mainly due to the 
largess of the international donor community.  For example, USAID 
modernized and equipped the Capital City and eight district courts with 
computers, furniture and audio equipment,63 and the World Bank funded 
the repairing and furnishing of the Supreme Court’s courtrooms, the 
Capital City Administrative courts, and Darkhan-Uul Aimag.64  As a 
result of these improvements, more than 78% of the experts surveyed 
agreed that the Mongolian court system “operates with a sufficient 
number of computers and other equipment to enable it to handle its 
caseload in a reasonably efficient manner.”65 
Mongolia has also made significant strides in improving judicial 
support staffing—each judge now has a set of court clerks.  With this 
addition, 80% of the experts agreed that judges have “the staff support 
necessary to do his or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to handle 
documentation and legal research.”66  Judicial salaries have also 
increased five times by a total of 220%,67 which translates to current 
salaries of roughly US $300-400 per month for lower court judges, and 
around US $700 per month for Supreme Court Judges.68  This amount is 
generally sufficient for judges to support their families and live in a 
reasonably secure environment.69  Even so, judicial salaries are 
unfavorable compared to private sector wages for professionals, and 
indeed, are significantly less than the salaries received by even relatively 
junior professional employees of some civil society organizations.70  
 
63 See ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 28-34. 
64 For a list of the contract awards and amounts awarded by the World Bank 
Group for the renovation, construction, and furnishing of the Mongolian courts, 
search for “Mongolia” at The World Bank Group’s Projects Portfolio, 
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
65 See supra, Table 3. 
66 See id. 
67 ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 40. 
68 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, Supreme Court Justice, 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 21, 2008). 
69 Cf. ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 40 (indicating that despite 
the salary increases, “the judges’ salaries . . . are not yet sufficient to guarantee 
decent living conditions.”). 
70 Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, supra note 60. 
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When compared to the salaries of top local corporate attorneys in 
Ulaanbaatar—who have billing rates of US $150 or more—judicial 
salaries are woefully insufficient to attract the best and the brightest 
attorneys.71  Furthermore, judicial positions in Mongolia are not 
prestigious enough to compensate for the low salary.72  Moreover, 
despite recent improvements to the Mongolian courtrooms, a significant 
majority of experts surveyed (63%) reported that court buildings, as a 
whole, still do not provide a respectable environment and infrastructure 
for the dispensation of justice.73 
Finally, the judiciary budget remains low, both in absolute dollar 
amounts and in comparison to the other branches of government.  In fact, 
the judiciary budget constitutes less than 0.5% of the national budget.74  
As a result, only 29% of the experts agreed that the overall court budget 
was sufficient to meet judicial demands.75  Nevertheless, the Mongolian 
Legislature has repeatedly rejected proposals to make the judicial budget 
to a percentage of the national budget, even when the requested budget is 
a mere 1% of the national budget.76  Consequently, the judicial budget is 
not only minimal at best, and actually less that the amount the courts 
generate in user fees each year, but also subject to manipulation by the 
other branches of the government.77  Thus, despite significant 
improvement in judicial resources and infrastructure, the situation is 
marginally sufficient at best. 
 
71 Id. 
72 There are, however, many opportunities to supplement one’s judicial 
salary through corrupt activities.  See infra, Table 4 & accompanying text. 
73 See Table 3, supra. 
74 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68. 
75 As shown in Table 3, supra, only 29% of the experts surveyed agreed 
with the statement:  “The overall budget of the courts is adequate to satisfy the 
demand for court services.” 
76 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68. 
77 Id. 
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Table 4:  Survey Results on Judicial Independence—Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
The court system has sufficient input and control 
over its own budget. The courts have a meaningful 
opportunity to influence the amount of money 
allocated to the courts by the legislative and/or 
executive branches.  Once the funds are allocated to 
the courts, the courts have control over their own 
budget and expenditure. 
3.1 
Disagree 32% 
Agree 41% 
Neutral 27% 
Passing 
The selection and appointment process fosters the 
selection of independent, impartial judges.  Judges 
are appointed based on objective criteria, such as 
passage of an exam, performance in law school, other 
training, experience, professionalism, and reputation 
in the legal community.  While political elements 
may be involved, the overall system fosters the 
selection of independent, impartial judges. 
2.7 
Disagree 54% 
Agree 32% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
Judges are provided adequate security.  Sufficient 
resources are allocated to protect judges from threats 
such as harassment, assault, and assassination. 
2.5 
Disagree 55% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 32% 
Failing 
Judges have guaranteed tenure.  Judges are appointed 
for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed tenure, 
which is protected until retirement age or the 
expiration of a defined term of substantial duration. 
3.9 
Disagree 9% 
Agree 77% 
Neutral 14% 
Passing 
Judges are promoted through the court system on the 
basis of objective criteria such as ability, integrity, 
and experience. 
3.1 
Disagree 23% 
Agree 36% 
Neutral 41% 
Passing 
Judges may be removed from office or otherwise 
punished only for specified official misconduct and 
through a transparent process, governed by objective 
criteria. 
3.0 
Disagree 32% 
Agree 41% 
Neutral 27% 
Neutral 
Once assigned to a case, a judge may be removed 
only for good cause, such as a conflict of interest or 
an unduly heavy workload.   
3.1 
Disagree 32% 
Agree 50% 
Neutral 23% 
Passing 
A judges’ association exists, the sole aim of which is 
to protect and promote the interests of the courts, and 
this organization is active. 
2.3 
Disagree 40% 
Agree 5% 
Neutral 40% 
Failing 
Court decisions are free from political influence from 
other branches of government or other public 
officials. 
2.5 
Disagree 43% 
Agree 19% 
Neutral 38% 
Failing 
 
230 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:209 
 
Although Mongolian judges do not lack in formal authority, are 
constitutionally independent from the other branches of government, and 
are guaranteed life tenure, the reality of judicial independence leaves 
much to be desired.  Indeed, only 19% of the experts surveyed agree that 
“Court decisions are free from political influence from other branches of 
government or other public officials.”78  Many of the experts share the 
view that high-ranking government officials, and in particular the 
President, exert considerable influence over Supreme Court and Tests 
decisions.  Moreover, some experts identified specific instances where 
high-ranking government officials arranged specific outcomes by 
interfering directly with judges.  This, however, is not to imply that 
government officials interfere in most cases.  Indeed, most cases are 
likely free from political interference.  But for cases where the personal, 
political, or business interests of government officials are at stake, the 
outcome is often heavily influenced. 
Unfortunately, judicial reform in Mongolia has done little to address 
political interfering in judicial decision-making.  In fact, certain features 
of the current system seem to reinforce, rather than restrict, such 
corroding influences.  First, the President has disproportionate power 
over the appointment, removal, and promotion of judges, and 
furthermore, each process lacks sufficient transparency.  Second, the 
judiciary budget, as well as the judges’ salaries, are subject to decrease in 
any given year.79  In the words of one Supreme Court justice, “the 
judicial budget depends on maintaining good relations with those in the 
legislative and executive branch who control budgetary decisions.”80  
This justice also indicated that the current Chief Justice has been very 
good at maintaining good relations, but “who knows what he had to give 
in return.”81  Third, the Judicial Code of Conduct does not prohibit 
judges from privately discussing pending or future litigation with other 
public officials or other non-parties who are free to convey their 
preferred outcomes to the judges.82 
 
78 See Table 4, supra. 
79 Interview with Anonymous, supra note 31. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Judicial Disciplinary Committee, Roundtable Meeting of Ethics and 
Disciplinary Committees and Councils of Legal Institutions 1 (Apr. 19, 2006) 
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Table 5:  Survey Results on Judicial Integrity—Grossly Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
Court decisions are not influenced by payments, 
gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested 
parties. 
2.0 
Disagree 77% 
Agree 0% 
Neutral 23% 
Failing 
Family, social, business, or other relationships do not 
influence judges’ conduct or judgment. 
2.0 
Disagree 73% 
Agree 9% 
Neutral 18% 
Failing 
Court decisions are free from the appearance of 
impropriety.  Judges refrain from hearing cases in 
which the judge’s family, social, business, or other 
relationships may create the appearance of a conflict 
of interest, whether or not such a conflict actually 
exist. 
2.3 
Disagree 59% 
Agree 9% 
Neutral 32% 
Failing 
Judges refrain from ex parte communications.  
Judges refrain from substantive communication with 
parties and their attorneys regarding matters before 
the court outside the presence of the other parties or 
their attorneys. 
2.0 
Disagree 82% 
Agree 9% 
Neutral 0% 
Failing 
Trial court decisions are reached without any undue 
influence from senior judges within the courts.  The 
senior judges include chief judges, Supreme Court 
judges, etc.  
2.3 
Disagree 64% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 22% 
Failing 
 
From the expert surveys and interviews, there was near universal 
agreement that court decisions are influenced by improper payments to 
judges and the judges’ personal interests.  A full 77% of the experts 
surveyed disagreed with the statement that “Court decisions are not 
influenced by payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested 
parties.”83  In addition, 73% disagreed with the statement that “Family, 
social, business, or other relationships do not influence judges’ conduct 
or judgment.”84  While one might expect, and should therefore guard 
against, a certain degree of relational influence over judicial decision-
making in a country as small as Mongolia, the fact that none of the 
 
(on file with author) (“Personal communication that might create an appearance 
of impropriety is discouraged, but not outright banned.”). 
83 See Table 5, supra.  Notably, none of the experts surveyed agreed with 
the statement. 
84 Id. 
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experts felt that judicial decisions were not influenced “by payments, 
gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested parties,” suggests a 
degree of outright bribery and corruption that cannot be rationalized.85  
Indeed, the experts interviewed expressed grave concern over corruption, 
and described judicial corruption as “pervasive.”  Furthermore, these 
experts pointed to numerous examples of judges trading decisions for 
personal or family gain, including apartments, health care abroad for 
family members, and, most commonly, cash. 
Table 6:  Survey Results on Judicial Code of Ethics—Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
The code of ethics for judges adequately defines and 
prohibits judges from hearing cases in which they 
have a conflict of interest.  
2.5 
Disagree 55% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 23% 
Failing 
The code of ethics for judges prohibits ex parte 
communications.  
2.3 
Disagree 53% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 33% 
Failing 
The code of ethics for judges prohibits judges from 
engaging in political activity. 
3 
Disagree 32% 
Agree 32% 
Neutral 36% 
Neutral 
 
Mongolia suffers from a weak judicial code of ethics that does not 
adequately define or prohibit judicial impropriety, nor guard against the 
appearance of impropriety, leading to the perception of corruption as 
well as actual judicial corruption.86  For example, the judicial code of 
ethics does not prohibit ex parte communications between judges and 
parties87 and 82% of the experts surveyed agreed that judges do, in fact, 
 
85 See id. 
86 See, e.g., WORKPLAN 2003, supra note 17, at 24-25 (indicating that 
amongst judges there was much confusion and misunderstanding as to the new 
ethical rules, forcing the JRP to create study guides and videos to educate the 
judiciary).  Cf. REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 25 (finding that despite the 
Judicial Reform Program’s recommendations for a new code of ethics, “some 
judges did not understand the need for a code of judicial ethics that held them to 
a higher standard than civil servants”). 
87 REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 25.  See also Judicial Disciplinary 
Committee, supra note 82. 
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privately meet with parties and/or their lawyers.88  Regardless of the 
substance of the discussions, such ex parte communications create an 
opportunity for corruption and may contribute to the public’s general 
suspicion of the courts.  Additionally, the judicial code of ethics does not 
prohibit judges from hearing cases in which they have a conflict of 
interest.  The surveyed experts indicated that judges frequently hear 
cases in which the judge’s family, social, business, or other relationships 
create a conflict of interest.  But regardless of whether judicial decisions 
are actually influenced by such conflicts, the lack of a clear prohibition 
creates an appearance of impropriety that no doubt contributes to the 
public perception of corruption within the courts.  Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these conflicts may indeed frequently influence 
judicial outcomes. 
Table 7:  Survey Results on Judicial Accountability—Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
A meaningful process exists under which other 
judges, lawyers, and the public may register 
complaints concerning misconduct by individual 
judges.   
2.8 
Disagree 41% 
Agree 27% 
Neutral 32% 
Failing 
Complaints of misconduct by judges are adequately 
investigated. 
2.5 
Disagree 46% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 31 
Failing 
Complaints of misconduct by judges are investigated 
without political interference from other branches of 
government. 
2.7 
Disagree 32% 
Agree 19% 
Neutral 50% 
Failing 
Investigations of misconduct by judges are not 
influenced by unofficial payments, gifts, or favors 
from judges or other interested parties. 
2.7 
Disagree 41% 
Agree 18% 
Neutral 41% 
Failing 
 
In addition to a weak judicial code of ethics, Mongolian judges who 
engage in clearly prohibited activities, such as taking bribes, are rarely 
held accountable.  Though Mongolia has established a Judicial 
Disciplinary Committee, the experts surveyed expressed concern that the 
Disciplinary Committee is used primarily to punish judges who are too 
independent, rather than those who abuse their power to solicit or accept 
bribes, or otherwise further their own self-interest.  For example, one 
 
88 See Table 6, supra. 
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judge was reportedly brought before the Disciplinary Committee for 
“performance issues” after he publicly disagreed with the Chief Judge 
over whether the judiciary should “work as a team,” arguing instead that 
judges should exercise independent judgment.89 
The experts also expressed concern—both in face-to-face interviews 
and in the survey—that judicial misconduct investigations are tainted by 
political interference and bribery.  Because Judicial Disciplinary 
proceedings lack transparency, however, it is difficult to substantiate 
such concerns.  Nevertheless, the Judicial Disciplinary Committee has 
released general statistics, which illustrate that the vast majority of 
complaints against judges are dismissed without action or explanation.90  
For example, between 2003 and 2005, 22 of the 28 complaints against 
judges in Ulaanbaatar were dismissed without explanation.91  
Furthermore, no information is publicly available as to who filed the 
complaints, the general content of any of the allegations, or the ultimate 
disposition of the other six complaints that were not dismissed.92  In the 
absence of public transparency, or an independent audit, the Judicial 
Disciplinary Committee is a black box, the inner workings of which 
remain a mystery.  Given the prevalence of grand corruption in 
Mongolia, the public—including the bar association—is also suspicious 
of corruption within the Disciplinary Committee. 
Because Mongolian law does not provide for whistleblower 
protection to individuals who report corruption, individuals risk 
persecution should they report instances of corruption to the authorities.  
Additionally, given the growing misuse of defamation law to silence 
those who report corruption, including the high-profile jailing of several 
reporters who have reported specific corruption incidents, there are few 
individuals willing to come forward even when they themselves are not 
 
89 Interview with Anonymous, Professor of Law, National University of 
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 22, 2008). 
90 ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 53. 
91 Id.  Nationally, only 14 judges were disciplined for unspecified reasons, 
though 143 complaints were filed.  See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10. 
92 Cf. REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10 (noting the JRP-recommended 
implementation of systems to inform complainants of the status of their 
complaints, but not mentioning any public disclosure). 
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implicated.93  The silencing of those who would report judicial 
corruption reflects a broader climate of systemic corruption and lack of 
accountability in Mongolia. 
The glaring lack of transparency as to how courts actually make 
decisions is one possible explanation for the high level of perceived or 
real corruption within the Mongolian courts.  The lack of transparency 
not only enables corrupt judges to hide impropriety, but also results in 
individuals suspecting corruption, even when there is none.  Given the 
systemic nature of corruption in Mongolia, one can hardly fault a losing 
litigant for, in the absence of a detailed written decision, suspecting that 
the judge may have been bought.  Experts believe that the only way to 
fight this perception of corruption is through a resolute commitment to 
absolute transparency.  Regrettably, agencies dealing with judicial 
reform in Mongolia have failed to make transparency a sufficient 
priority, despite frequent claims that increasing “transparency” is a core 
goal of reform.94  As evidence of this failure: 
• Only 18% of the experts surveyed agree that judges are assigned 
to cases in a transparent and objective manner.95 
• Although courtroom proceedings are technically open to the 
public, in practice, courtrooms have inadequate space to 
accommodate the public.  As a result, members of the public are 
routinely excluded from hearings and trials.96 
 
93 One public official within the anti-corruption agency, in fact, warned me 
that I would risk prosecution for defamation if I published this report, and 
particularly if I identified specific judges as those perceived to be most corrupt 
by attorneys.  Interview with Anonymous, Prevention and Public Awareness 
Department, Anti-Corruption Agency, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (June 5, 2008). 
 94 The 2006 Judicial Reform Program (“JRP”) annual report claims, for 
example, that 2006 was “highlighted by improved access to and transparency in 
the courts,” and identifies courtroom redesign and renovation as one of the main 
activities leading to increased transparency.  REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 3.  
The 2006 report also argues that that the JRP increased “transparency” through 
the creation of a website, www.judgeinfo.mn, which operates as a source of 
basic information about the courts “including court decisions.”  Id. at 3.  Local 
attorneys complain, however, that the website contains very few decisions and is 
frequently inaccessible.  Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, supra note 60. 
95 See Table 8, infra. 
96 Court Observer Program by Otgontenger Univ., Final Report (2005) (on 
file with author).  I also witnessed court clerks order all members of the public, 
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• Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions are rarely 
published, and when published, are not widely circulated. 
• District court decisions are never published, and are not 
otherwise available to the public. 
• There are no transcripts of trial court proceedings.  The only 
records of trial court proceedings are court-produced summaries 
of the trial testimony that provide, at best, an incomplete record, 
and, at worst, a distorted record for appeal. 
• Even these incomplete court-produced summaries of trial court 
proceedings are not available to the media or the general public. 
• 82% of the experts surveyed indicate that court users do not have 
easy access to information on the status of their cases.97 
• District courts typically announce outcomes but rarely explain 
the reasoning (i.e., the facts and the application of the law) 
behind their decisions, leading to a sense of inscrutability as to 
the basis of court decisions. 
• Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions are rarely 
subject to academic scrutiny,98 which contributes not only to 
sloppy and unclear decisions, but also to a lack of accountability, 
as questionable decisions are not subject to criticism. 
 
except for the parties, out of courtrooms on several occasions.  For example, I 
was twice ordered to leave myself. 
97 Despite USAID touting the new public access computers stationed in 
many courthouses as evidence of the progress of judicial reform in Mongolia, 
see ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 15-19, there is still a lack of 
access to information.  In reality, the public access computers are often turned 
off, broken, or otherwise inaccessible to the public. Court Observer Program, 
supra note 96. 
98 One expert explained that most law professors must also practice law in 
order to survive given their low salaries and fear that criticizing the courts would 
threaten their livelihood.  Most academics, the expert explained, “are in the 
pockets of the judges.”  Interview with Anonymous, supra note 89. 
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Table 8:  Survey Results on Judicial Transparency—Grossly Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are subjected to academic scrutiny. 
2.3 
Disagree 68% 
Agree 19% 
Neutral 13% 
Failing 
Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are subjected to scrutiny by the media 
and the general public. 
2.7 
Disagree 50% 
Agree 41% 
Neutral 9% 
Failing 
Judges are assigned to cases by an objective 
method, such as by lottery, or according to their 
specific areas of expertise. 
2.6 
Disagree 41% 
Agree 18% 
Neutral 41% 
Failing 
Courtroom proceedings are open to the public 
and the media. 
2.5 
Disagree 59% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 18% 
Failing 
Courtrooms have adequate space to 
accommodate the public and the media. 
2.0 
Disagree 82% 
Agree 9% 
Neutral 9% 
Failing 
Court decisions are generally a matter of 
accessible public record. 
2.5 
Disagree 68% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 5% 
Failing 
Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are published. 
2.2 
Disagree 86% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 0% 
Failing 
Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to litigants and their attorneys. 
3.5 
Disagree 14% 
Agree 69% 
Neutral 17% 
Passing 
Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to the media and general public. 
2.2 
Disagree 63% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 23% 
Failing 
Court users have easy access to information on 
the status of their case. 
1.9 
Disagree 82% 
Agree 9% 
Neutral 9% 
Failing 
Current law is distributed and indexed.  There is 
a nationally recognized system for indexing 
current domestic laws and jurisprudence, and 
identifying and organizing changes in the law. 
2.7 
Disagree 45% 
Agree 41% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
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Table 9:  Survey Results on Judicial Efficiency and Predictability—
Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
The court system maintains an effective and 
accessible case filing and tracking system that 
ensures cases are heard in a reasonably 
efficient manner. 
2.7 
Disagree 50% 
Agree 27% 
Neutral 23% 
Failing 
Judges follow and enforce procedural rules. 2.2 
Disagree 68% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 18% 
Failing 
Rules of evidence exist as to what evidence 
judges may or may not consider. 
2.4 
Disagree 63% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
Judges follow any existing rules of evidence. 
Judges do not consider improper evidence nor 
exclude proper evidence. 
2.3 
Disagree 63% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
Court standards for evaluating legal arguments 
exist and are applied in a predictable fashion.   
2.1 
Disagree 64% 
Agree 14% 
Neutral 14% 
Failing 
 
Despite the fact that the Judicial Reform Program focuses on 
improving judicial efficiency through better case management and court 
automation,99 only 27% of the experts surveyed agree that there is an 
effective and accessible case management system.100  Similarly, 68% felt 
that judges fail to follow and enforce procedural rules for handling 
cases.101 
Moreover, the survey participants indicated that judges do not 
enforce procedural rules, do not follow rules of evidence, and do not 
apply legal standards or rules in a predictable fashion.102  The 
unpredictability and unevenness of judicial decision-making is reflected 
in the error rate in district court decisions, which approaches nearly 
 
99 See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10-13 (describing JRP programs and 
results). 
100 See Table 9, supra.  Notably, 50% of the experts surveyed disagreed 
with the statement that the court system maintains an effective and accessible 
case filing and tracking system. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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80%.103  This error rate is persuasive evidence that district court judges 
are either unqualified, continue to be inadequately trained, or decide 
cases (or are reversed) on the basis of external factors such as political 
influence or bribery. 
Table 10:  Survey Results on Judicial Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms—Insufficient 
Survey Question 
Avg. 
Score 
Distribution Score 
The pre-trial settlement of disputes is 
encouraged but not forced. 
3.2 
Disagree 28% 
Agree 58% 
Neutral 14% 
Passing 
Established alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration 
provide a viable alternative to court processes. 
2.5 
Disagree 54% 
Agree 23% 
Neutral 13% 
Failing 
 
Mongolia has taken a number of positive steps to promote alternative 
dispute resolution.  First, to encourage pre-trial settlement, the filing fees 
are halved for parties who settle before trial.104  Mongolian law also 
allows for voluntary binding arbitration of any civil dispute, either before 
established tribunals such as one set up by the Chamber of Commerce, or 
an ad hoc tribunal agreed upon by the parties.105  Additionally, on May 5, 
2006, a mediation center, staffed by nine attorneys, was established with 
the assistance of the Japan International Cooperation Agency.106  
Nevertheless, several of the experts interviewed gave the mediation 
center low marks in terms of quality.  Moreover, mediation is not 
formally recognized as a form of dispute resolution in Mongolian law, 
and there are no court-annexed mediation programs.  Judges also lack the 
 
103 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68. Only 3% of civil 
cases are actually appealed.  Id.  Possible explanations for this low rate of 
appeal, despite a reversal rate that would seem to encourage appeals, are:  lack 
of financial resources to appeal, lack of  information about the right to appeal, 
or—as one expert suggested—that only those who are well-connected enough to 
be able influence the appellate courts bother to appeal.  Interview with 
Anonymous, Corporate Attorney, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 6, 2008). 
104 ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 75. 
105 Id. at 76. 
106 Id. at 7. 
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power to order parties to attempt settle their dispute through mediation 
before continuing with litigation. 
IV.  THE DANGERS OF CAPTURE BY TARGET (“REGULATED”) JUDICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
The actual state of the Mongolian judiciary hardly supports USAID’s 
claim that its Judicial Reform Program was “very successful” and “one 
of its best projects ever.”107  In particular, the Judicial Reform Program 
failed to deliver on its primary goal to “[i]ncrease transparency and 
accountability throughout the judicial sector.”108  Nor did the project 
substantially improve judicial efficiency, predictability, or 
transparency—despite USAID claims to the contrary.109  In short, the 
substance and quality of the “justice” dispensed by the Mongolian courts 
does not seem to have changed for the better.  It is just dispensed in 
better surroundings, by better paid judges, who have nice computers. 
The failure of judicial reform to noticeably improve judicial 
integrity, accountability or transparency stems at least in significant part 
from the failure to implement meaningful and comprehensive measures 
to address corruption.110  This less-than-vigorous approach to addressing 
 
107 See USAID/Mongolia, supra note 22. 
108 REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1.  See also REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 
20 (“One of the main goals of the JRP throughout the project has been to 
increase the transparency and accountability of the courts. One important 
activity that was implemented to achieve this goal was the installation of Public 
Access Terminals (PATs) in each court.)”  As discussed above, supra note 74, 
the PATs which are touted as proof of the success of the JRP in increasing 
transparency are frequently turned off or otherwise inaccessible to court users.  
See Court Observer Program, supra note 96. 
109 See REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 3 (“A number of JRP activities have 
led to better access to and increased transparency in the judicial sector.”). 
110 The establishment of a Special Investigative Unit to investigate 
misconduct by justice sector officials “was the only concrete step by the 
Government of Mongolia to combat crime and corruption within the justice 
sector.”  REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 8.  A consultant hired by JRP found, 
however, that the SIU’s ability to investigate corruption is severely limited by 
underfunding and the failure of the legislature to give the SIU “authority to 
conduct surveillance and undercover operations.”  Emery E. Adoradio, Special 
Investigative Unit Under the Prosecutor General Preliminary Assessment and 
Recommendations, in REPORT 2006, supra note 5, attach. B at 2.   As such, 
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corruption may have reflected, in part, inadequate political will among 
key Mongolian stakeholders within the judiciary and government.111  It is 
not enough, however, to blame the failure of judicial reform on corrupt 
Mongolian elites.  Lack of political will to address judicial corruption 
should have factored into the decision of whether and under what 
conditions to embark on judicial reform in Mongolia in the first place, 
and might have warranted an early end to some donor projects.  As early 
as 2002, for example, USAID recognized that “lack of accountability and 
transparency, and lack of public trust and confidence” threatened the 
ability of the Mongolian judiciary to serve the interests of a “democratic 
society and free market economy.”112 
Yet, no effort seems to have been made to secure host country 
commitment to the goals of transparency and accountability before 
investing over 13 million dollars into its multi-year Judicial Reform 
Program.  Moreover, USAID funded a multi-million dollar extension of 
 
“[t]he SIU analyst focuses on statistics and workload indicators that are used to 
determine bonuses rather than on analyzing data that could be used to identify 
patterns of police, judicial and prosecutorial corruption.”  Id.  Moreover, SIU 
work focuses almost exclusively on police misconduct, not corruption among 
judges.  Interview with Badamragchaa Purevdorj, Program Manager, Legal and 
Human Rights Programs, Open Society Forum, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 18, 
2008). 
In contrast to this half-hearted approach, a comprehensive anti-corruption 
program would have included measures to incentivize judicial integrity, shore-
up judicial independence, create meaningful accountability, ensure actual 
transparency and otherwise limit opportunities for judicial corruption.  A list 
concrete and specific measures that Mongolia could have taken, and might still 
take given adequate political will, as part a comprehensive program to address 
judicial corruption is included in Appendix A, infra. 
111 Not only does judicial corruption benefit corrupt judges, but it also 
facilitates grand corruption among other economic and political elites in 
Mongolia.  Absent pressure from donor agencies, there is simply no incentive 
for these elites to promote anti-corruption reform in the judiciary, and plenty of 
reason for them to actively obstruct it.  See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., 
USAID ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY 11 (2005), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ 
anticorruption_strategy05.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (“Sixty-nine percent 
[of USAID missions] indicated that insufficient political commitment on the part 
of national counterparts was a constraint [in combating corruption].”). 
112 REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1. 
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JRP,113 despite indications of growing corruption within the judiciary 
during the first six years of the Judicial Reform Program—indications 
the JRP dismissed as “coincid[ing] with the public’s overall 
dissatisfaction with Mongolia’s government.”114  As with the original 
establishment of the JRP, the extension was funded without any 
commitment from the judiciary to address the corruption issue.  To the 
contrary, the extension was granted in the face of demonstrated 
stakeholder resistance to measures designed to improve accountability 
within the courts—including changes to the judicial ethics code, 
introduction of judicial performance evaluations, and reforms to ensure 
the merit-based selection of judges.115 
Similarly, the World Bank funded the construction of the NLC116 and 
recently invested an additional five million dollars, primarily to refurbish 
the Supreme Court,117 despite the widespread perception of undue 
political influence and corruption with the judiciary.  World Bank 
funding was, on both occasions, not accompanied by a commitment from 
the judiciary to address corruption issues.  This lack of conditionality 
seems incongruent with the Bank’s view of corruption as “among the  
greatest obstacles to economic and social development.”118  It is also 
incongruent with the Bank’s recognition that because “the legal system 
will be the ultimate arbiter of any anticorruption program, a corrupt 
 
113 REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 3 (“JRP . . . was granted a cost extension 
in June [2006] to operate until June 30, 2008”). 
114 REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 27. 
115 See, e.g., REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 8-10 (indicating, inter alia, that 
JRP recommendations from 2006 to ensure merit-based selection of judges were 
still on hold by the General Council of Courts at the end of 2007); REPORT 2006, 
supra note 5, at 10-11 (discussing incomplete action from the General Council 
of Courts on JRP recommendations to ensure merit based selection of  judges 
and on strengthening the judicial code of ethics); REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 
25 (noting that despite the JRP recommendations there was refusal to add 
restrictions to the judicial code of ethics against ex parte communications). 
116 See The World Bank Group, supra note 52. 
117 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 635. 
118 The World Bank Group, Anticorruption:  Overview of Anticorruption 
Continued, http://go.worldbank.org/K6AEEPROC0 (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
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judiciary will fundamentally undermine anticorruption efforts 
themselves.”119 
Absent a high-level commitment to root out judicial corruption, “top-
down” judicial reform programs are destined to neglect the core concerns 
of judicial integrity, accountability, and transparency.  Moreover, judicial 
reform does not address these core issues, it is likely not only to fail but 
also to perpetuate and reinforce perceptions of corruption within the 
courts.120  One lesson of Mongolia is thus one that has been learned 
before: donors should not finance institutional reform of judiciaries “with 
pervasive levels of corruption,”121 at least not until high-level political 
leadership has demonstrated a commitment to combating judicial 
corruption. 
Another lesson is that donor-funded judicial reform projects risk 
capture by target judiciaries—in much the same way that domestic 
regulatory bodies risk capture by regulated industries.122  The risk of 
judicial capture arises as an initial matter because top-down approaches 
to judicial reform typically depend on elites within target judicial 
 
119 THE WORLD BANK, ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION:  A CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE POLICY DEBATE 14 box 1.5 (2000). 
120 Cf. id. at 18. (“The costs of state capture and administrative corruption 
are mutually reinforcing . . . .”). 
121 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 111, at 16-17 & box 1. 
122 See Jean-Philippe Platteau, Community-Based Development in the 
Context of Within-Group Heterogeneity (“Project facilitators tend to easily fall 
prey to local elites either because they are in a rush to show results and therefore 
gloss over local power relations, or because they are too weak to resist their 
pressure and the donor agency is not supporting them enough.” (citation 
omitted)), in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 2004:  ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT, 241, 251 (François 
Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2004).  See also THE WORLD BANK, supra 
note 119, at 33-34 (“FDI firms headquartered in . . . local market[s] . . . are just 
as likely [as domestic firms] to engage in state capture,” and this is 
“substantially more likely” when the firm is located in a country with existing 
“high levels of administrative corruption and state capture.”). 
For a discussion of regulatory agency capture, see generally PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991) and Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and 
Airplanes):  The Federal Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and 
Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381 (2002). 
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institutions for information as to the realities and needs on the 
ground123—particularly when donor project employees do not speak the 
local language or have significant country expertise.124  This dependency 
is compounded by the frequent physical location of donor projects within 
target judicial institutions, which risks over-identification with 
institutional interests at the cost of reform goals.125 Similarly, close 
working relationships, and friendships, that arise between project 
employees and target institution employees can obscure objectivity and 
lead to willful blindness to corruption within judicial institutions.126  This 
tendency for willful blindness can be exacerbated when, as is not 
infrequently the case, high-ranking project employees themselves wish to 
be identified with the political and social elites of the host country127—or 
 
123 See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 17-19 (explaining that reformers 
frequently operate without good information or knowledge of “the real intents of 
the government officials who are their local partners”). 
 124 Cf. id. at 18  (noting that the knowledge of project facilitators often 
“skate[s] along the surface of how a foreign society operates”); Platteau, supra 
note 122, at 248 (stating that program “facilitators are too often young, poorly 
paid, and inexperienced individuals”).  See also Judicial Reform Program:  Q4 
Updates 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html  
(posting of Skip Waskin, Dec. 13, 2005, 20:13) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) 
(evidencing former JRP Chief of Party Ledbetter’s lack of previous Mongolian 
expertise or experience); Lawyer John A. Carver Appointed as the JRP Chief of 
Party, http://www.ncsc.mn (follow link to document title) [hereinafter Carver 
Appointed] (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (evidencing newly appointed JRP Chief’s 
lack of experience with or knowledge of Mongolia). 
125 See Platteau, supra note 122, at 244-45 (indicating that “social capital 
may be harnessed against rather than in favor of vulnerable segments of the 
population” as a result of close social and economic relationships with local 
elites that act as a “barrier[] to entry” for the actual public interest). 
126 See id. at 242-43 (discussing the “praise culture” that arises among 
actors in a top-down approach).  One project manager in a donor-funded Judicial 
Reform Program, for example, insisted that in “ten years” of working with the 
Courts, he had never seen “any evidence” of judicial corruption or improper 
influence.  Interview with Javkhlan, GTZ Project Manager, Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia (May 12, 2008). 
127 See ROSSABI, supra note 1, at 64-65 (“The lifestyles of the resident 
representatives of the international donor agencies also raised some eyebrows.  
A few, although certainly not all, lived in gated, guarded communities in 
Ulaanbaatar, while a tiny group were in even more lavish surroundings, guarded 
by the military, in an area where the president and the prime minister resided, 
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are driven by career goals that “are not well aligned with the needs of 
[the] projects.”128 
A combination of these factors seems to have contributed to the 
capture of USAID’s Judicial Reform Program by elites within the 
judiciary, who were then able to successfully direct the efforts of the 
Judicial Reform Program toward their own priorities.129  These elites 
understandably preferred to focus on activities such as courthouse 
construction and repair, purchase of computers and equipment, judicial 
training, and international jaunts rather than on accountability and 
transparency.130 
Looking beyond Mongolia, the inherent risk of project capture in the 
institution-building approach to judicial reform may help explain the 
continued focus on resources and infrastructure in donor-funded judicial 
reform projects, despite repeated criticism from both within and without 
donor agencies that the approach yields dismal results.131 In other words, 
judicial reform efforts may begin, as the USAID project in Mongolia 
seems to have begun, with noble intentions of addressing “lack of 
accountability and transparency,”132 but end up doing little to address 
either as projects increasingly focus on the concerns and priorities of 
 
which was closed to the public. Visitors had to have invitations; otherwise, the 
military would not permit them to enter this compound.  The spacious quarters, 
well-appointed furnishings, and the latest appliances, contrasted sharply with the 
lifestyles of all but the very highest officials with whom the foreign 
representatives dealt.”). 
128 Platteau, supra note 122, at 248. 
129 Cf. REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 23 (“The Strategic Plan has a large 
number of specific objectives and tasks. However, USAID, in consultation with 
the Mongolian stakeholders, focused the JRP on a limited number of critical 
areas which included: Court Administration and Case Management, Review of 
Court and Justice Sector Agency Jurisdictions, Continuing Legal Education 
(CLE), Lawyer Qualification, Public Education and improved Ethics.”). 
130 See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 8-9 (describing that the orthodox 
institutional approach to judicial reform); Judicial Reform Program:  Q4 
Updates 2005, supra note 124 (posting of Skip Waskin, Nov. 9, 2005, 20:07) 
(reporting study tour to Hawaii). 
131 See, e.g., id. at 11-14 (documenting the “weak track record” of donor 
efforts to promote rule of law through judicial reform and noting that “[e]xternal 
reviews of ROL aid efforts have been highly critical”). 
132 REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1. 
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institutional elites.  In Mongolia, for example, this meant USAID’s 
Judicial Reform Program  spent much of its final year focusing on 
completing software upgrades that were considered the “highest 
priorities” of “the Chief Justice and the Director of the General Council 
of Courts” rather than addressing widespread perceptions of judicial 
corruption.133  Indeed, USAID’s view that its Judicial Reform Program 
was a great success seems closely tied to “complet[ing] the development 
and testing of the new Judge2008 automated case tracking and caseflow 
management software” and “hand[ing] over” the software prior to the 
project’s termination in March  2009.134  While this software upgrade 
may in fact have been a significant accomplishment, such technical 
progress is overshadowed by growing corruption, bias, and other forms 
of undue influence within the Mongolian judiciary.135 
USAID’s rosy picture of the success of judicial reform in Mongolia 
simply cannot be squared with the continuing presence of rampant 
corruption within the judiciary and the crisis of public legitimacy that the 
courts face as a result. The divergence between USAID’s assessment of 
its Judicial Reform Program’s impact and the shared negative assessment 
of the courts among local experts highlights, at a minimum, the need for 
independent, outside review of the progress and success of donor-funded 
reform projects.136  This need arises from the intrinsic incentives for 
donor agencies, their implementing partners, and their employees to 
oversell the success of reform projects.  First, donor agencies must 
 
133 USAID/Mongolia Programs August 2008, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
programs/jrp/jrp-update-367.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
134 USAID/Mongolia Programs February 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/ 
programs/jrp/jrp-update-566.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
135 See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 18 (“Although technical progress can 
take place even in the face of undue influences, where such influences are 
widespread they tend to trump the value of the technical change.”). 
136 Cf. REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 4 (revealing a lack of independent 
monitoring of the JRP in that the review was conducted by of key stakeholders, 
namely “a group of representatives from the judiciary, prosecution, advocacy 
and MoJHA led by the JRP’s consultant”).  See generally LIVINGSTON 
ARMYTAGE, CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MONITORING PERFORMANCE OF 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:  
EARLY LESSONS FROM PORT MORESBY & PHNOM PENH 3 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Monitoring 
Impact.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (arguing for increased “monitoring and 
evaluation of legal and judicial reform efforts around the world”). 
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justify judicial reform programs in countries where candid assessment of 
the progress of judicial reform might raise questions about the proper use 
of taxpayer funds.  Second, implementing partners, such as the National 
Center for State Courts which oversaw the Judicial Reform Program in 
Mongolia and the ABA Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, 
which oversees USAID judicial reform programs in much of Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe, compete for USAID funds and must tout the 
success of their projects both to secure extensions of existing projects 
and to win future projects and grants.  Third, high-ranking employees of 
these organizations often go from country-to-country as “judicial reform 
experts,” leveraging “successful” reform efforts for other high-level 
positions.137 
Even independent assessments of donor funded projects, however, 
cannot address the fundamental problem with the top-down, institution-
oriented approach to judicial reform:  It just doesn’t work, particularly in 
countries characterized by systemic corruption.138  Despite USAID’s 
 
137 See, e.g., ABA Rule of Law Initiative Europe and Eurasia Divsision 
Staff, http://www.abanet.org/rol/staff-ceeli.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) 
(stating that former JRP Chief of Party Gary Ledbetter left Mongolia to work for 
the ABA as a Country Director for its judicial reform program in Georgia);  JRP 
Chief of Party, Robert La Mont, To Leave Mongolia, MONG. JUD. REFORM 
PROGRAM MONTHLY NEWSL., Sept 15-Oct 15, 2006, at 1, 1-2, available at 
http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Newsletter/EN/Newsletter62English.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009) (reporting that former JRP Chief of Party to begin a USAID 
judicial reform project in Indonesia); JRP Project Director, Dr. Heike 
Gramckow, To Leave the National Center for State Courts, MONG. JUD. REFORM 
PROGRAM MONTHLY NEWSL., March 2008, at 1, 1-2, available at 
http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Newsletter/EN/Newsletter76English.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009) (reporting that former JRP Director to take a position as the 
Senior Legal Counsel to the World Bank's Legal and Judicial Reform Group); 
and Carver Appointed, supra note 124 (reporting that current Chief of Party, 
John Carver previously worked for USAID in both Haiti and Mexico). 
138 Golub, supra note 9, at 11-14 (documenting the “weak track record” of 
donor efforts to promote rule of law and arguing the folly of such efforts).  See 
generally HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF 
JUSTICE:  STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW 
PROGRAMS § 3 (1994), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy 
_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnaax280.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) 
(noting the folly of the institution-oriented strategy to judicial reform where 
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claims to the contrary, Mongolia is no exception.  Rather, the record of 
judicial reform in Mongolia should add to calls for a shift from 
institution-building, top-down models of judicial reform to bottom-up, 
community-based models designed to empower local communities to 
fight on their own against corruption, bias, and unequal access to 
justice.139 
 
corruption is rampant); THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: 
THE LEARNING CURVE 170-76 (1999) (reporting the “disappointing” record of 
USAID work with judiciaries across the world); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE 
JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA:  DECLINING 
CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW 1-9 (2000) (offering bleak assessment of 
donor funded judicial reform in Latin America); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/NSAID-93-149, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:  PROMOTING JUDICIAL 
REFORM TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACIES (1993) (finding serious flaws in the 
institutional approach to judicial reform in Latin America); Klaus Decker et al., 
Law or Justice:  Building Equitable Legal Institutions 18 (World Bank, Working 
Paper No. 33653, 2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/2YW13HB0I0 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009). 
139 See generally DANIEL MANNING, THE ROLE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
ORGANIZATIONS IN ATTACKING POVERTY 5-6 (1999), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPGENDER/Resources/Role
Legal_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009);  MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE:  THE LAW-
RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary 
McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000), available at 
http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/many_roads.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 
2009); Golub, supra note 9, at 25-41 (calling for “legal empowerment” approach 
to reform); Monica Das Gupta et al., Fostering Community-Driven 
Development:  What Role for the State? 1-3 (World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2969, 2003). 
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APPENDIX A:  COMPREHENSIVE REFORM MEASURES TO ADDRESS 
JUDICIAL CORRUPTION 
“[T]he [Multilateral Development] Banks and other international 
agencies” have failed to develop an “effective[] judicial anti-corruption 
strategy” in spite of continuing involvement in combating judicial 
corruption.140  Meanwhile, judicial reform experts have in fact identified 
a number of specific, targeted measures that can be effective in reducing 
corruption, especially when combined in a comprehensive anti-
corruption program.  Given the apparent lack of political will within the 
Mongolian judiciary to address corruption, however, the list below is 
meant primarily to identify measures—both tested and new—that civil 
society organizations, NGOs, and private industry could push for in 
Mongolia to combat judicial corruption.  Moreover, some of the 
measures could be undertaken with or without the cooperation of the 
courts and might thus be appropriate avenues for donor funding. 
Measures To Incentivize Judicial Integrity 
1.  Judges should be subjected to periodic judicial performance 
evaluations designed to, at a minimum, evaluate each judge’s integrity, 
fairness, temperament, legal knowledge, legal reasoning, diligence and 
professionalism.141  These evaluations should be based upon confidential 
surveys completed by members of the bar and members of the general 
public who have appeared before the judge.  Judges’ overall scores on 
these periodic surveys should be made publicly available.  Ideally, such 
evaluations should be administered by an independent commission—
with the backing of the General Council of Courts, the Ministry of 
Justice and Home Affairs, and the Mongolian Bar Association.  
However, it would also be possible for civil society organizations to 
conduct the performance evaluations independently and publicize the 
results.  Such evaluations might serve as further evidence of the need for 
the types of reforms proposed below. 
 
140 Hammergren, supra note 7, at 73. 
141 See generally INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM, TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE™:  A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (2006), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ 
TransparentCourthouse.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (outlining a judicial 
performance evaluation program). 
250 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:209 
 
2.  Minimum qualification requirements should be established for 
newly appointed judges.  Judges should be required to have graduated 
from a law school,142 passed the bar exam, and have at least three years 
experience as an attorney or prosecutor.143 
3.  Selection of judges should be based on objective criteria, such as 
scores on a civil service exam with only the highest scorers eligible for 
appointment, in order of their scores.144 Such a system would not only 
ensure that the most qualified individuals were appointed to the bench, 
but also mitigate social exchange corruption pressures inherent in the 
current appointment system.145 
4.  In order to incentivize good judging, promotions within the court 
system (for example, from district court judge to appellate court judge), 
and the level of a judge’s pay, should be merit-based—at least in some 
significant way.146 
 
142 Ideally judges should be required to have graduated from an accredited 
law school.  Likewise, Mongolia should also implement accreditation standards 
for law schools.  Because Mongolia currently does not have an accreditation 
process for law schools, there has been a proliferation of law schools of 
questionable quality. 
143 See, e.g., Carlo Guarnieri, Professional Qualifications of the Judiciary in 
Italy, France, and Germany (citing the German practice of requiring high marks 
on state exam and six years of training before full judicial appointment), in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 56, 59; Keith Henderson, 
The Rule of Law and Judicial Corruption in China:  Half-way Over the Great 
Wall (noting that China now requires all judges to have a college degree and to 
pass a national examination, both significant steps in the arena of Chinese 
judicial reform), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 151, 
157. 
144 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 19-20 (discussing the civil law 
model, which creates a more apolitical judiciary through emphasis on lifetime 
civil service that begins with a competitive exam and promotion through the 
judicial hierarchy pursuant to evaluation by superiors and special councils). 
145 See Transparency International, Executive Summary:  Key Judicial 
Corruption Problems (“Failure to appoint judges on merit can lead to the 
selection of pliant, corruptible judges.”), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, 
supra note 5, at xxi, xxiv. 
146 See Yang & Erichs, supra note 18, at 51-52 (supporting the promotion of 
judges through transparent, merit-based criteria in order to prevent promotions 
due to political affiliation and/or improper means). 
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5.  Judges’ salaries should be sufficiently high to attract the best legal 
minds and also high enough that judges will be reluctant to engage in 
corrupt activities that risk their jobs.  This would require salaries in the 
USD$1,000 to $3,000 range—with a judge’s actual pay within that range 
determined by merit.  Additionally, judges’ salaries should, by law, never 
decrease—except for demotions with the defined pay range for judicial 
misconduct.  However, the proposed salary increases should not take 
place until the judiciary adopts a no tolerance policy toward corruption 
and puts in place specific mechanisms designed ensure judicial 
transparency and accountability.147 
Reforms Targeted at Transparency 
1.  A transparent system for the assignment of cases, such as a 
lottery, should be developed.  Once assigned to a case, the rules should 
provide that a judge may be removed only for good cause, such as a 
conflict of interest.148 
2.  Notices should be posted on every courtroom that all proceedings 
are open to the public, regardless of whether the member of the public 
has any connection to the case being heard. Judges and clerks should be 
censured for failing to allow open access.149 
 
147 See Tom Blass, Combating Corruption and Political Influence in 
Russia’s Court System (favoring judicial salaries which achieve parity to 
comparable private sector industry salaries so as to reduce incidences of bribery 
and to retain a qualified judiciary), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, 
supra note 5, at 31, 34.  See also Yang & Erichs, supra note 18, at 49 (defining 
“adequate” salaries for the judiciary as salaries which allow legal professionals 
to “support their families, remain loyal to their profession and, at least, have no 
economic ‘need’ for resorting to corruption”). 
148 See Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption Within the Judiciary:  Causes and 
Remedies (preferring random case assignment so as to avoid the intentional 
assignment of particular cases to corrupt judges), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
REPORT 2007 supra note 5, at 3, 8. 
149 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (mentioning the role of open 
public access to trials and court proceedings as a check on judicial power).  See 
also Edward Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption and the Broader Justice System 
(arguing that public court proceedings are correlated with lower incidences of 
corruption), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 67, 72. 
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3.  District courts should be required by law produce written 
decisions that discuss the relevant facts and law and explain the 
reasoning behind their decisions.150 
4.  All court decisions and court filings should be made available on 
a daily basis in a public access or media tray at each courthouse, so that 
the media or other members of the public can review the filings and 
decisions and thereby monitor the daily activities of the court.151 
5.  Verbatim transcripts should be produced of all court proceedings.  
These transcripts should be available to both litigants and any member of 
the public for a reasonable fee—and should be provided free to indigent 
litigants who need the transcripts for appeal.152 
6.  An official reporter system should be established to collect and 
publish all district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court decisions.  
Preferably, the reporter system should be electronic and online to ensure 
broad access, reduce costs, and enable timely publication.  There should 
also be free computer access terminals to the reporter system at the 
National Legal Center in Ulaanbaatar and other convenient locations in 
 
150 See Rena Safarelieva, Azerbaijan’s Yawning Gap Between Reforms on 
Paper and in Practice (recommending the online publication of all Azerbaijan’s 
Supreme Court, economic court and constitutional court decisions and requiring 
that these decisions provide written reasoning explaining the verdict of each 
case), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 175, 178. 
151 Copy machines should be available so that media organizations, civil 
society organizations, and other members of the public can, for a reasonable fee, 
make copies of court filings and decisions.  Media organizations, and possibly 
civil society organizations, should assign “court reporters” the responsibility of 
checking the public access or media tray on a daily basis.  See, e.g., Buscaglia, 
supra note 149, at 74 (finding that effective monitoring of the court occurs 
through public access to judicial procedures as well as social pressure created by 
media assessment and critique). 
152 Cf. Press Release, New Jersey Judiciary, New Appellate Pilot Program 
Helps Indigent Litigant Obtain Free Legal Representation (September 13, 2007) 
(discussing New Jersey pilot program established to provide for representation 
for indigent litigants involved in the appellate process, where volunteer 
attorneys purchase trial record for indigent clients), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/pr070913a.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 
2009). 
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each Aimag or Soum for use by attorneys and other members of the 
public.153 
7.  The public should be provided meaningful access to information 
about the status of cases before the courts.  Such information should be 
provided in the form of a “docket sheet,” which should, for example, list 
the title and date of all court filings, list all actions taken by the court 
such as hearings and rulings on motions, and the date of any future 
hearings or court deadlines.  These docket sheets should be available not 
only via public access terminals in the court houses, but also online. 
8.  A court observer program should be instituted to monitor whether 
judges exclude the public from hearings and follow proper procedures.  
Observers should also evaluate judges on their fairness, temperament, 
and professionalism.  A previous court observer program conducted by 
law students at Otgontenger University could be revamped and revived 
for this purpose.154 
9.  De novo appeals should be eliminated. 
10.  Uniform rules of evidence should be adopted and published.  
These rules of evidence should be trans-substantive and applied in all 
court proceedings. 
11.  A uniform code of civil procedure should be adopted and 
published.  The code of civil procedure should be trans-substantive and 
applied in all civil proceedings. 
12.  Upon termination of trial court proceedings, all court users 
should be given an easy-to-understand pamphlet explaining their right to 
appeal and describing clearly the necessary steps and deadlines to file 
such an appeal.  The pamphlet should also inform individuals of the right 
to receive a copy of the trial court’s written decision and, if they are 
unable to pay for it, a free copy of the record of trial court proceedings. 
Reforms Targeted at Accountability 
1.  A separate body should be established to investigate judicial 
misconduct—or the current Judicial Disciplinary Committee should be 
reconstituted.  No judges should be on the Committee, nor should it be 
headed, as it is currently, by the Chief Justice.  Members of the 
Committee should not be politically appointed, but rather selected by a 
 
153 See Pepys, supra note 148, at 9 (finding that publishing judicial 
decisions reduces judicial corruption). 
154 See Court Observer Program, supra note 96. 
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civil service exam or some other objective measure.  The Committee 
should have investigative and subpoena powers and the resources to 
conduct investigations, including undercover operations.155 
2.  A clear set of rules for removal of judges from office should be 
developed to ensure that judges may be removed from office or 
otherwise punished only for specified official misconduct through a 
transparent process, governed by objective criteria.156 
3.  Independent audits of the Judicial Disciplinary Committee should 
be conducted to ensure the proper and consistent investigation of 
complaints of judicial misconduct.  The results of these audits should be 
made public.157 
4.  The procedures and rules for investigating and disciplining judges 
should be revamped in according to best international practices so that: 
(a) the disciplinary process is more transparent and fair, with strict and 
exacting standards; (b) the standard of proof is not so high as to 
effectively shield judges from a finding of misconduct; (c) judges who 
are eventually found to have engaged in misconduct are publicly 
identified; and, (d) if there is a finding of corruption, the judge is 
prosecuted as matter of policy and practice. 
 
155 See Oluyemi Osinbajo, Sub-National Reform Efforts:  The Lagos State 
Experience (citing the implementation of an independent investigation panel to 
examine claims of judicial corruption), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, 
supra note 5, at 146, 149.  See also, Transparency International, Country 
Reports on Judicial Corruption:  Introduction (recommending the creation of an 
independent disciplinary committee with the authority to investigate complaints 
of judicial wrongdoing in countries where there is strong political influence on 
the judiciary and arbitrary discipline of independent judges), in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 167, 169. 
156 See Transparency International, Executive Summary: Key Judicial 
Corruption Problems (stressing the importance of standardized discipline and 
removal procedures to minimize the removal of independent judges because of 
political differences), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 
xxi, xxvi.  See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that U.S. federal 
judges are removed only for egregious behavior). 
157 See Roxana Salazar & José Pablo Ramos, Increased Transparency Helps 
Curb Corruption in Costa Rica (discussing Costa Rican reforms, which created 
a supreme judicial council with administrative and disciplinary duties as well as 
a separate tribunal of judicial inspection which handles complaints against the 
judiciary), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at, 190, 191. 
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5.  The Judicial Code of Ethics should be revised in keeping with 
international best practices.  At a minimum, the Code should be amended 
to: 
• Prohibit ex parte communications with parties or their 
lawyers.158 
• Prohibit high court or senior judges from discussing pending or 
prospective cases with junior or lower court judges. 
• Prohibit judges from hearing any case where a relative was 
involved in any part of the case, including as a lower court judge 
hearing the case, a prosecutor trying the case, or an attorney or 
party on either side of the litigation.159 
• Prohibit judges from engaging in any employment other than as 
a judge, or from owning, in whole or in part, any business 
enterprise.160 
• Clearly define what constitutes a conflict of interest and prohibit 
judges from hearing any case in which there is a real or apparent 
conflict of interest.161 
• Prohibit judges from discussing pending or prospective litigation 
with any individual outside the court, whether a private 
individual or government official. 
6.  Rigorous asset and income disclosures should be required, and the 
burden should be placed on judges to document lawful sources for all 
income and assets.162 
 
158 See Hammergren, supra note 7, at 77 (intimating that ex parte 
communications, though not always “readily perceived as corruption by the lay 
person,” are nevertheless a damaging form of judicial corruption). 
159 See Greg Mayne, Judicial Integrity:  The Accountability Gap and the 
Bangalore Principles (supporting judicial restrictions to prohibit members of the 
judiciary from hearing cases involving family members, as well as prohibiting 
family members from appearing before judges in any capacity), in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 40, 42. 
160 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that the United States 
has strict laws restricting business activities of judges). 
161 See Transparency International, supra note 155, at 170 (advocating the 
need for a clear description of “conflict of interest” and a requirement that 
judges report such conflicts of interest and recuse themselves from cases in 
which conflicts exist). 
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7.  Judges should be required to disclose the identities of all relatives 
(including their degree of relation) who are, or were, previously judges, 
prosecutors, or attorneys. 
8.  A judicial “family tree” should be constructed and publicized to 
highlight family connections with the judiciary and to help monitor 
conflicts of interests. 
Special Anti-Corruption Measures 
1.  A jury system should be considered—at least in criminal cases 
which defendants face jail time and in civil matters where the amount in 
dispute is over Tug 10 million.163 
2.  Individuals who report judicial corruption should receive 
whistleblower protection.  Such protection must include immunity from 
prosecution and immunity from civil or criminal liability for defamation 
should the corruption not ultimately be substantiated (at least in absence 
evidence of malice or actual knowledge by the individual that the 
allegation was false at the time it was made).164 
3.  Judges should be rotated to different courts, including courts in 
different Aimags and Soums in order to mitigate the corrupting effect of 
social exchange relationships.  Such rotations should ideally require 
 
162 See Pepys, supra note 148, at 9 (advocating for thorough verification and 
monitoring system of judges’ assets).  See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 
21 (highlighting the United States’ practice of strict asset disclosure 
requirements for judges). 
163 See Brent T. White, Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth:  Corruption 
and the Case for Juries in Emerging Democracies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359338 (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009) (manuscript at 3) (arguing that juries can serve as an effective 
means of combating judicial corruption and of increasing public trust in the 
fairness of the judicial process). 
164 See Paul Latimer & A.J. Brown, Whistleblower Laws:  International 
Best Practice 18-22, (Monash U. Dep’t of Bus. L. & Taxation Research Paper 
No. 1326766, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326766 (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2009) (finding that best practices of whistleblower protection laws 
include support of disclosure of wrongdoing as well as trust in the system 
stemming from protection from civil or criminal liability, discrimination and 
retaliation). 
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judges to move to a different court every few years.165  A less disruptive 
alternative, however, might be to require judges to rotate during parts of 
the year (such as during the summer months) to courts in different 
Aimags or Soums. 
 
165 See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Civil Procedure:  
Judging the Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L., 793, 803 (1997) (proposing that the 
Chinese judiciary system follow example of the Chinese imperial system which 
required magistrates to move every three years to decrease the development of 
collusive relationships). 
258 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:209 
 
APPENDIX B:  SURVEY OF THE STATUS OF COURT REFORM IN 
MONGOLIA 
This survey seeks your input on the status of court reform in Mongolia.  
Your responses will remain anonymous.  If you do not have sufficient 
knowledge to respond to any particular item, please leave it blank. 
 
Years in Legal Profession: ______ 
 
Current Position (optional): ___________________________ 
Years in Current Position (optional): _______ 
 
Please state your agreement or disagreement with the statements below 
according to following scale: 
Strongly disagree 1 
Disagree  2 
Neutral   3 
Agree   4 
Strongly Agree  5 
 
1.  Judges are well-qualified.  (Judges have formal 
university-level legal training and have practiced 
before tribunals before taking the bench.)  
1 2 3 4 5 
2.  Judges are well-trained.  (Before taking the 
bench judges are required to take relevant courses 
concerning basic substantive and procedural areas 
of the law and the role of the judge in society.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  Judges receive adequate continuing legal 
education.  (Judges must undergo, on a regular 
basis professionally prepared legal education 
courses, which adequately inform them of changes 
and developments in the law.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.  The number of judges who are members of 
ethic and religious minorities adequately reflects 
the percentage of ethic and religious minorities in 
the overall population. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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5.  The number of male and female judges is 
roughly equal at all levels of the court system.   
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  Court decisions are respected and enforced by 
other branches of government 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  The courts provide adequate oversight over the 
administrative practices of the executive branch.  
(In other words, the court has the power to review 
administrative acts and to compel the government 
to act where a legal duty to act exists—and it 
exercises this power when appropriate.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  Court decisions may be reversed only through 
the appellate process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.  Courts have adequate subpoena, contempt, and 
enforcement powers.  
1 2 3 4 5 
10.  The courts’ subpoena, contempt, and 
enforcement powers are utilized and supported by 
other branches of government. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11.  Other branches of government do not override 
or ignore court decisions, or if they do, they are 
subject to legal action. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.  The overall budget of the courts is adequate to 
satisfy the demand for court services. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.  The overall budget of the courts has increased 
proportionately with the growth of the national 
budget. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14.  The judiciary receives a share of the national 
budget reflective of its position as co-equal branch 
of government 
1 2 3 4 5 
15.  Offices provided to judges and court 
administrators are adequate to allow performance 
of their duties 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.  The court system operates with a sufficient 
number of computers and other equipment to 
enable it to handle its caseload in a reasonably 
efficient manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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17.  Each judge has the staff support necessary to 
do his or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to 
handle documentation and legal research. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18.  A system exists so that new court positions are 
created as needed 
1 2 3 4 5 
19.  Judges’ salaries are adequate.  (Judges’ 
salaries meet some reasonable proportion of good 
wage in private sector, are generally sufficient to 
attract and retain qualified judges, enabling them to 
support their families and live in a reasonably 
secure environment, without having to have 
recourse to other sources of income). 
1 2 3 4 5 
20.  Court buildings provide a respectable 
environment for the dispensation of justice with 
adequate infrastructure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21.  The court system has sufficient input and 
control over its own budget. (The courts have a 
meaningful opportunity to influence the amount of 
money allocated to the courts by the legislative 
and/or executive branches, and, once funds are 
allocated to the courts, the courts have control over 
their own budget and how such funds are 
expended). 
1 2 3 4 5 
22.  The selection and appointment process fosters 
the selection of independent, impartial judges.  
(Judges are appointed based on objective criteria, 
such as passage of an exam, performance in law 
school, other training, experience, professionalism, 
and reputation in the legal community. While 
political elements may be involved, the overall 
system fosters the selection of independent, 
impartial judges). 
1 2 3 4 5 
23.  There is adequate security for judges.  
(Sufficient resources are allocated to protect judges 
from threats such as harassment, assault, and 
assassination). 
1 2 3 4 5 
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24.  Judges have guaranteed tenure.  Judges are 
appointed for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed 
tenure, which is protected until retirement age or 
the expiration of a defined term of substantial 
duration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25.  Judges are promoted through the court system 
on the basis of objective criteria such as ability, 
integrity, and experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26.  Judges may be removed from office or 
otherwise punished only for specified official 
misconduct and through a transparent process, 
governed by objective criteria. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27.  Once assigned to a case, a judge may be 
removed only for good cause, such as a conflict of 
interest or an unduly heavy workload.   
1 2 3 4 5 
28.  A judges’ association exists, the sole aim of 
which is to protect and promote the interests of the 
courts, and this organization is active. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29.  Court decisions are free from political 
influence from other branches of government or 
other public officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30.  Court decisions are not influenced by 
payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other 
interested parties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31.  Court decisions are free from impropriety.  
Family, social, business, or other relationships do 
not influence judges’ court conduct or judgment.   
1 2 3 4 5 
32.  Court decisions are free from the appearance 
of impropriety.  Judges refrain from hearing cases 
in which the judge’s family, social, business, or 
other relationships may create the appearance of a 
conflict of interest, whether or not such a conflict 
actually exist.  
1 2 3 4 5 
262 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:209 
 
33.  Judges refrain from ex parte communications.  
(Judges refrain from substantive communication 
with parties and their attorneys regarding matters 
before the court outside the presence of the other 
parties or their attorneys). 
1 2 3 4 5 
34.  Trial court decisions are reached without any 
undue influence from senior judges within the 
courts (e.g., chief judges, Supreme Court judges, 
etc…). 
1 2 3 4 5 
35.  The code of ethics for judges adequately 
defines and prohibits judges from hearing cases in 
which they have a conflict of interest.  
1 2 3 4 5 
36.  The code of ethics for judges prohibits ex parte 
communications.  
1 2 3 4 5 
37.  The code of ethics for judges prohibits judges 
from engaging in political activity. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38.  A meaningful process exists under which other 
judges, lawyers, and the public may register 
complaints concerning misconduct by individual 
judges.  
1 2 3 4 5 
39.  Complaints of misconduct by judges are 
adequately investigated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40.  Complaints of misconduct by judges are 
investigated without political interference from 
other branches of government. 
1 2 3 4 5 
41.  Investigations of misconduct by judges are not 
influenced by unofficial payments, gifts, or favors 
from judges or other interested parties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42.  Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are subjected to academic scrutiny. 
1 2 3 4 5 
43.  Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are subjected to scrutiny by the media and 
the general public. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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44.  Judges are assigned to cases by an objective 
method, such as by lottery, or according to their 
specific areas of expertise.  
1 2 3 4 5 
45.  Courtroom proceedings are open to the public 
and the media. 
1 2 3 4 5 
46.  Courtrooms have adequate space to 
accommodate the public and the media. 
1 2 3 4 5 
47.  Court decisions are generally a matter of 
accessible public record. 
1 2 3 4 5 
48.  Supreme Court and significant appellate 
opinions are published. 
1 2 3 4 5 
49.  Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to litigants and their attorneys. 
1 2 3 4 5 
50.  Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to the media and general public. 
1 2 3 4 5 
51.  The court system maintains an effective and 
accessible case filing and tracking system that 
ensures cases are heard in a reasonably efficient 
manner.  
1 2 3 4 5 
52.  Court users have easy access to information on 
the status of their case. 
1 2 3 4 5 
53.  Current law is distributed and indexed.  (There 
is a nationally recognized system for indexing 
current domestic laws and jurisprudence and 
identifying and organizing changes in the law). 
1 2 3 4 5 
54.  Procedural rules for handling cases are 
standardized and time limits are set for the 
completion of various stages of litigation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
55.  Judges follow and enforce procedural rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
56.  Rules of evidence exist as to what evidence 
judges may or may not consider. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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57.  Judges follow any existing rules of evidence 
(Judges do not consider improper evidence nor 
exclude proper evidence). 
1 2 3 4 5 
58.  Court standards for evaluating legal arguments 
exist and are applied in a predictable fashion.   
1 2 3 4 5 
59.  The pre-trial settlement of disputes is 
encouraged but not forced.  
1 2 3 4 5 
60.  Established alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration 
provide a viable alternative to court processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please add any comments relating to any of your responses above.  In 
particular, we would be very interested in your thoughts as to the most 
pressing issues, if any, that need to be addressed in reforming the 
Mongolian Courts.  Please use additional pages as necessary. 
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APPENDIX C:  RESULTS OF SURVEY OF THE STATUS OF COURT REFORM IN MONGOLIA 
 
Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. 
Judges are well-qualified. (Judges have formal 
university-level legal training and have practiced 
before tribunals before taking the bench.) 
14% 52% 14% 20% 0% 2.4 66% 20% 
2. 
Judges are well-trained. (Before taking the bench 
judges are required to take relevant courses 
concerning basic substantive and procedural areas 
of the law and the role of the judge in society.) 
19% 38% 24% 19% 0% 2.4 57% 19% 
3. 
Judges receive adequate continuing legal 
education. (Judges must undergo, on a regular 
basis, professionally prepared legal education 
courses, which adequately inform them of changes 
and developments in the law.) 
0% 19% 33% 43% 5% 3.3 19% 48% 
4. 
The number of judges who are members of ethic 
and religious minorities adequately reflects the 
percentage of ethic and religious minorities in the 
overall population. 
26% 16% 37% 21% 0% 2.5 42% 21% 
5. 
The number of male and female judges is roughly 
equal at all levels of the court system. 
29% 48% 19% 5% 0% 2.0 77% 5% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
6. 
Court decisions are respected and enforced by 
other branches of government. 
9% 41% 18% 23% 9% 2.7 50% 32% 
7. 
The courts provide adequate oversight over the 
administrative practices of the executive 
branch.(In other words, the court has the power to 
review administrative acts and to compel the 
government to act where a legal duty to act 
exists—and it exercises this power when 
appropriate.) 
18% 46% 18% 18% 0% 2.3 64% 18% 
8. 
Court decisions may be reversed only through the 
appellate process. 
4.5% 4.5% 9% 73% 9% 3.8 9% 82% 
9. 
Courts have adequate subpoena, contempt, and 
enforcement powers. 
4.5% 4.5% 9% 59% 23% 3.9 9% 82% 
10. 
The courts’ subpoena, contempt, and enforcement 
powers are utilized and supported by other 
branches of government. 
0% 5% 18% 68% 9% 3.8 5% 77% 
11. 
Other branches of government do not override or 
ignore court decisions, or if they do, they are 
subject to legal action. 
9% 27% 22% 36% 5% 3.0 36% 41% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
12. 
The overall budget of the courts is adequate to 
satisfy the demand for court services. 
14% 19% 38% 24% 5% 2.8 33% 29% 
13. 
The overall budget of the courts has increased 
proportionately with the growth of the national 
budget. 
5% 14% 33% 42% 5% 3.0 19% 47% 
14. 
The judiciary receives a share of the national 
budget reflective of its position as co-equal branch 
of government. 
5% 14% 33% 42% 5% 3.2 19% 47% 
15. 
Offices provided to judges and court 
administrators are adequate to allow performance 
of their duties. 
0% 41% 9% 41% 9% 3.2 41% 50% 
16. 
The court system operates with a sufficient 
number of computers and other equipment to 
enable it to handle its caseload in a reasonably 
efficient manner. 
0% 5% 18% 64% 14% 3.9 5% 78% 
17. 
Each judge has the staff support necessary to do 
his or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to 
handle documentation and legal research. 
0% 10% 10% 62% 18% 3.7 10% 80% 
18. 
A system exists so that new court positions are 
created as needed. 
14% 14% 52% 19% 0% 2.8 28% 19% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
19. 
Judges’ salaries are adequate.(Judges salaries meet 
some reasonable proportion of good wage in 
private sector, are generally sufficient to attract 
and retain qualified judges, enabling them to 
support their families and live in a reasonably 
secure environment, without having to have 
recourse to other sources of income). 
9% 27% 18% 32% 14% 3.0 36% 46% 
20. 
Court buildings provide a respectable environment 
for the dispensation of justice with adequate 
infrastructure. 
27% 36% 32% 0% 5% 2.1 63% 5% 
21. 
The court system has sufficient input and control 
over its own budget. (The courts have a 
meaningful opportunity to influence the amount of 
money allocated to the courts by the legislative 
and/or executive branches, and, once funds are 
allocated to the courts, the courts have control 
over their own budget and how such funds are 
expended). 
0% 32% 27% 36% 5% 3.1 32% 41% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
22. 
The selection and appointment process fosters the 
selection of independent, impartial judges.(Judges 
are appointed based on objective criteria, such as 
passage of an exam, performance in law school, 
other training, experience, professionalism, and 
reputation in the legal community. While political 
elements may be involved, the overall system 
fosters the selection of independent, impartial 
judges). 
18% 36% 14% 27% 5% 2.7 54% 32% 
23. 
There is adequate security for judges.(Sufficient 
resources are allocated to protect judges from 
threats such as harassment, assault, and 
assassination). 
14% 41% 32% 14% 0% 2.5 55% 14% 
24. 
Judges have guaranteed tenure.Judges are 
appointed for fixed terms that provide a 
guaranteed tenure, which is protected until 
retirement age or the expiration of a defined term 
of substantial duration. 
0% 9% 14% 68% 9% 3.9 9% 77% 
25. 
Judges are promoted through the court system on 
the basis of objective criteria such as ability, 
integrity, and experience. 
5% 18% 41% 36% 0% 3.1 23% 36% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
26. 
Judges may be removed from office or otherwise 
punished only for specified official misconduct 
and through a transparent process, governed by 
objective criteria. 
5% 27% 27% 41% 0% 3.0 32% 41% 
27. 
Once assigned to a case, a judge may be removed 
only for good cause, such as a conflict of interest 
or an unduly heavy workload. 
0% 32% 23% 50% 0% 3.1 32% 50% 
28. 
A judges’ association exists, the sole aim of which 
is to protect and promote the interests of the 
courts, and this organization is active. 
20% 20% 40% 5% 0% 2.3 40% 5% 
29. 
Court decisions are free from political influence 
from other branches of government or other public 
officials. 
19% 24% 38% 19% 0% 2.5 43% 19% 
30. 
Court decisions are not influenced by payments, 
gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested 
parties. 
23% 54% 23% 0% 0% 2.0 77% 0% 
31. 
Court decisions are free from impropriety. Family, 
social, business, or other relationships do not 
influence judges’ court conduct or judgment. 
32% 41% 18% 9% 0% 2.0 73% 9% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
32. 
Court decisions are free from the appearance of 
impropriety. Judges refrain from hearing cases in 
which the judge’s family, social, business, or other 
relationships may create the appearance of a 
conflict of interest, whether or not such a conflict 
actually exist. 
18% 41% 32% 9% 0% 2.3 59% 9% 
33. 
Judges refrain from ex parte communications. 
Judges refrain from substantive communication 
with parties and their attorneys regarding matters 
before the court outside the presence of the other 
parties or their attorneys. 
27% 55% 9% 9% 0% 2.0 82% 9% 
34. 
Trial court decisions are reached without any 
undue influence from senior judges within the 
courts. Senior judges include chief judges, 
Supreme Court judges, etc. 
23% 41% 23% 14% 0% 2.3 64% 14% 
35. 
The code of ethics for judges adequately defines 
and prohibits judges from hearing cases in which 
they have a conflict of interest. 
14% 41% 23% 23% 0% 2.5 55% 23% 
36. 
The code of ethics for judges prohibits ex parte 
communications. 
24% 29% 33% 14% 0% 2.3 53% 14% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
37. 
The code of ethics for judges prohibits judges 
from engaging in political activity. 
5% 27% 36% 32% 0% 2.9 32% 32% 
38. 
A meaningful process exists under which other 
judges, lawyers, and the public may register 
complaints concerning misconduct by individual 
judges. 
9% 32% 32% 27% 0% 2.8 41% 27% 
39. 
Complaints of misconduct by judges are 
adequately investigated. 
23% 23% 31% 23% 0% 2.5 46% 23% 
40. 
Complaints of misconduct by judges are 
investigated without political interference from 
other branches of government. 
14% 18% 50% 14% 5% 2.7 32% 19% 
41. 
Investigations of misconduct by judges are not 
influenced by unofficial payments, gifts, or favors 
from judges or other interested parties. 
5% 36% 41% 18% 0% 2.7 41% 18% 
42. 
Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions 
are subjected to academic scrutiny. 
27% 41% 14% 14% 5% 2.3 68% 19% 
43. 
Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions 
are subjected to scrutiny by the media and the 
general public. 
18% 32% 9% 36% 5% 2.7 50% 41% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
44. 
Judges are assigned to cases by an objective 
method, such as by lottery, or according to their 
specific areas of expertise. 
9% 32% 9% 36% 5% 2.6 41% 41% 
45. 
Courtroom proceedings are open to the public and 
the media. 
18% 41% 18% 23% 0% 2.5 69% 23% 
46. 
Courtrooms have adequate space to accommodate 
the public and the media. 
27% 55% 9% 9% 0% 2.0 82% 9% 
47. 
Court decisions are generally a matter of 
accessible public record. 
18% 50% 5% 23% 0% 2.5 68% 23% 
48. 
Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions 
are published. 
27% 59% 0% 14% 0% 2.2 86% 14% 
49. 
Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to litigants and their attorneys. 
5% 9% 17% 64% 5% 3.5 14% 69% 
50. 
Transcripts or some other reliable record of 
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are 
available to the media and general public. 
27% 36% 23% 14% 0% 2.2 63% 14% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
51. 
The court system maintains an effective and 
accessible case filing and tracking system that 
ensures cases are heard in a reasonably efficient 
manner. 
9% 41% 23% 27% 0% 2.7 50% 27% 
52. 
Court users have easy access to information on the 
status of their case. 
36% 46% 9% 9% 0% 1.9 82% 9% 
53. 
Current law is distributed and indexed.(There is a 
nationally recognized system for indexing current 
domestic laws and jurisprudence, and identifying 
and organizing changes in the law). 
18% 27% 14% 36% 5% 2.7 45% 41% 
54. 
Procedural rules for handling cases are 
standardized and time limits are set for the 
completion of various stages of litigation. 
27% 27% 14% 32% 0% 2.4 54% 32% 
55. Judges follow and enforce procedural rules. 23% 45% 18% 14% 0% 2.2 68% 14% 
56. 
Rules of evidence exist as to what evidence judges 
may or may not consider. 
18% 45% 14% 23% 0% 2.4 63% 23% 
57. 
Judges follow any existing rules of evidence. 
Judges do not consider improper evidence, nor 
exclude proper evidence. 
27% 36% 14% 23% 0% 2.3 63% 23% 
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Survey Question 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) Avg. 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree / 
Strongly 
Agree 
58. 
Court standards for evaluating legal arguments 
exist and are applied in a predictable fashion. 
32% 32% 23% 14% 0% 2.1 64% 14% 
59. 
The pre-trial settlement of disputes is encouraged 
but not forced. 
14% 14% 14% 58% 0% 3.2 28% 58% 
60. 
Established alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration 
provide a viable alternative to court processes. 
18% 36% 23% 18% 5% 2.5 54% 23% 
 
